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Abstract
The risk premium puzzle is even worse than previously reported if housing is also
taken into consideration next to equity. While housing premia are only moderately
smaller than equity premia, they are significantly less volatile and the Sharpe ratio of
housing is significantly larger. Hence, three question arise: i) are existing approaches
to explain the equity premium puzzle also capable of explaining even larger Sharpe
ratios than previously required, ii) can return rates and volatilities of various assets
be differentiated, and iii) can different Sharpe ratios between the two risky assets be
matched.
We analyze these questions, next to business cycle statistics, by including housing
into seminal approaches to solve the risk premium puzzle in production economies.
Non-disaster economies with habit formation, capital adjustment costs and limited
factor mobility fail to generate a Sharpe ratio of housing of the empirically observed
size and do not explain co-moving economic activity. A basic model with time-varying
disaster risk can reproduce the large Sharpe ratio of housing. Moreover, the model
can explain different means and volatilities of the risky assets, economic activity co-
moves and the model explains the volatility ratio of business investments, residential
investments and house prices. However, the model does not allow to disentangle the
Sharpe ratios of the risky assets and premia on equity remain too involatile.
Acknowledgment: We are grateful to our academic advisor Prof. Alfred Maußner for initial ideas and
ensuing discussions. The paper significantly benefits from comments during the Autumn Forum "Glob-
alization of Real Estate Markets" at Zurich University, the 11th ReCapNet conference "Real Estate Asset
Pricing" at ZEW Mannheim, the TU Munich Research Seminar in Economics, and the 29th BGPE Research
Workshop in Nuremberg.
1 INTRODUCTION
The seminal publications of Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989) have issued a
challenge to macroeconomic models: explaining the historically observed sizeable equity
premium (excess of the return on a stock market index over the return of a relatively risk-
less security) together with the low risk-free rate for a reasonable degree of risk aversion.
While standard real business cycle (RBC) models are successful in accounting for impor-
tant stylized facts of the business cycle, they typically fail to reproduce the empirically
observed characteristics of asset returns. Over the past years, different approaches have
been suggested by the literature in order to solve the puzzle. To name but a few, Jermann
(1998) combines modifications to the standard preference structure with frictions in the
adjustment of input factors, Boldrin et al. (2001) add frictions in the allocation of input
factors, and Gourio (2012) introduces a risk for rare but severe economic disasters. While
these models are able to replicate the empirical risk premium on stocks, they commonly
ignore an asset which, according to Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2019) (JST), forms
roughly 50 percent of an advanced economy’s total wealth, namely housing. Looking at
it the other way round, the RBC literature which focuses on housing generally does not
consider implications for asset returns either. In the present paper, we therefore aim to
combine the two strands of the literature with the objective to mutually explain key asset
pricing and business cycle statistics including housing.
The new database built by Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick, and Taylor (2019) (JKKST)
covers long term data on the return on equity, on the return on housing and on the return
on total wealth as well as data on government bills and bonds for 16 advanced economies.
Based on this new data, JST re-measure the return rates on a representative investor’s to-
tal portfolio and find that the risk premium puzzle by Mehra and Prescott (1985) in fact
further worsens if attention is not restricted to stocks only: the Sharpe ratio of housing
is even larger than the Sharpe ratio of equity. Their result raises three questions. First,
are existing approaches capable of explaining even larger Sharpe ratios than previously
required for risky assets, second, can return rates and volatilities of various assets be dif-
ferentiated, and third, can different Sharpe ratios between the two risky assets be matched.
They show that several popular approaches which were previously shown to be success-
ful in reproducing the return rates on stocks, turn out less successful once the return on
housing and the return on total wealth are also taken into consideration. While the study
of JST considers various different approaches including habit formation as in Abel (1990)
and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) or disaster risk with and without recursive utility as
in Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), and Bansal and Yaron (2004), they focus on endowment
economies throughout.
We think that studying more general asset pricing statistics also in production economies
is important for various reasons. First, the analysis of multiple assets asks for an explana-
tion of the empirically observed differences in the mean return rates, volatilities and Sharpe
ratios. For example, in the Lucas (1978) framework for asset prices, different Sharpe ra-
tios of assets can only be realized if the correlations of the assets’ returns with the model’s
stochastic discount factor differ. While different volatilities of returns and different cor-
relations between return rates and consumption growth are introduced exogenously in
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endowment economies, the explanation of these features becomes an important exercise
in production economies. Second, as argued by Cochrane and Hansen (1992), any friction
which can help to reproduce asset pricing statistics may on the other hand have empirically
counterfactual implications for business cycle statistics. Hence, the effects of such fric-
tions on both, asset prices and business cycles, should be analyzed simultaneously within
the framework of RBC models. Third, many mechanisms which can explain risk premia
in endowment economies may fail in general equilibrium since the household can alter
his plans to smooth consumption and thereby insure himself. Fourth, the business cycle
is potentially the macroeconomic phenomenon with the largest effects on asset returns.
Hence, explaining the key facts of asset return rates and the business cycle in the same
internally consistent model is important in order to gain insights into this relationship.
Fifth, RBC models are the backbone for a broader class of Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models used for stabilization policy analysis. For this purpose, an un-
satisfactory performance with regard to asset pricing statistics may constitute a significant
shortcoming of these models. For example, high risk premia may diminish investment
activities even if the riskless interest rate is low.
In our analysis we simultaneously focus on partly puzzling stylized facts of asset prices
and the business cycle. These stylized facts are identified as common features from his-
toric data which are valid for several developed countries over long time periods. Among
the stylized facts which characterize asset returns are: i) a stable risk-free rate smaller
than 2.25 percent, ii) return rates on equity moderately larger than returns on housing,
iii) risk premia on equity, on housing and on total risk larger than 3 percent, iv) return
rates and premia on equity which are at least twice as volatile as return rates and premia
on housing and on total risk, and v) a Sharpe ratio of housing significantly larger than
the Sharpe ratio of equity. Turning to business cycle statistics, they reveal the following
important characteristics: i) residential investments are at least moderately more volatile
than business investments, ii) house prices are at least twice as volatile as Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), and iii) house prices, business investments as well as GDP are positively
correlated with residential investments, and the correlation between house prices and GDP
is also positive. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) designate the ability to generate correlated
movements of subaggregates as a litmus test for RBC models.
The starting point of our analysis is a variation of the Jermann (1998) model with ex-
ogenous labor but extended by a separate housing stock. Following Davis and Heathcote
(2005), the stock of houses differs from productive capital in two aspects. First, it enters
the household’s utility function whereas productive capital enters the production function
and, second, houses depreciate at a lower rate. While we assume the same capital adjust-
ment costs in line with the ’q-theory’ for business investments as in Jermann (1998), convex
adjustment costs for housing arise from the fact that new houses require that residential
structures must be linked to land. Moreover, we first assume that business investments,
residential investments and the consumption good are homogenous goods. This assump-
tion together with the fact that the elasticity of housing in the household’s consumption
bundle as well as the depreciation rate of houses are both small, allows the household
to conveniently smooth his consumption bundle across different states of nature through
optimal adjustment of residential investments in response to technology shocks. In conse-
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quence, risk premia in the Jermann (1998) model with housing vanish even when large
habits in consumption and housing are assumed. Nevertheless, the model can predict a
pro-cyclical demand effect for residential investments. House prices fluctuate more than
GDP and the model reproduces the observed co-movements from the data.1
In a second step we restrain the household’s option to smooth his consumption bundle
after the shock’s realization. We consider a two sector model where residential invest-
ments are produced in one sector whereas production of business investments and of the
consumption good takes place in a second sector. The productive capital stock is sector-
specific and immobile, and subject to adjustment costs in both sectors as in Fehrle (2019).
This model can be interpreted as a stripped down version of the multi-sectoral model by
Davis and Heathcote (2005) and is similar to the model of Nguyen (2018). Sticking at first
to the assumption of exogenous labor supply, the model can produce moderate risk premia.
The model’s ability to explain sizeable risk premia is lost once labor supply is determined
endogenously, but can be recovered if labor mobility between the sectors is limited similar
to Boldrin et al. (2001). However, the model performs worse with respect to the residen-
tial business cycle statistics and in particular fails to generate co-moving economic activity
between the two sectors. In consequence, we conclude that the model cannot explain size-
able risk premia and the observed co-moving economic activity simultaneously. Further,
return rates turn out far too volatile in the model. The standard deviation of the risk-free
rate exceeds its empirical counterpart by a factor of 8 while the return rates on housing and
on the total portfolio are more than 4 and more than 2 times, respectively, as volatile as in
the data. Moreover, the model cannot explain any of the empirically observed differences
between equity and housing.
Including housing into disaster economies turns out more promising. We consider an
otherwise standard RBC model with housing where economic disasters are introduced
through large negative shocks which reduce total factor productivity and also destroy pro-
ductive capital and residential structures to the same extent. Moreover, the model features
time-varying disaster risk and recursive preferences of the class introduced by Epstein and
Zin (1989). Different elasticities of Tobin’s q and of house prices help to explain differences
in the mean and in the volatilities between returns on unlevered equity and on housing
while leverage additionally helps to differentiate the effect. Keeping the coefficient of rel-
ative risk aversion to a moderate level of 5.5, the model can explain a low return rate on
government bonds of 1.31 percent on average (1.57 percent in the US data) and is able to
replicate an equity premium of 6.56 percent (5.88 in the US data). In accordance with the
data, return rates on housing turn out moderately lower than on equity and the housing
premium in the model is 3.00 percent (compared to 4.45 percent in the US data). The to-
tal risk premium in the model turns out to be 4.98 percent and closely matches the value
from the data (5.27 in the US data). Next to mean return rates and premia, the model
can also match the low volatility of government bonds fairly well. Time-varying disaster
risk helps to increase the volatility of the risky assets’ returns and allows to closely repro-
duce the standard deviations of returns and premia on housing as well as on total risk.
1Note that in a benchmark one sector model co-moving business and residential investments are a puzzle
because the household intends to increase productive capital first. See also Kydland et al. (2016).
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However, the standard deviations of returns and premia on equity remain too small. The
model can closely replicate the Sharpe ratio of housing and the Sharpe ratio of the total
portfolio from the data but does not match the significantly smaller Sharpe ratio of equity.
Although the premia and their volatilities differ between the two risky assets, the model
cannot generate different Sharpe ratios.
The disaster model is able to generate relative volatilities of business investments, res-
idential investments and house prices which all fit the data. Business investments are
almost 3 times as volatile as GDP, residential investments are more than twice as volatile
as business investments and house prices are almost twice as volatile as GDP. In line with
Dorofeenko et al. (2014), we find that time-varying uncertainty is important for the latter
result. The model further reproduces the empirically observed correlation between GDP
and residential investments and between GDP and house prices. The correlations between
residential investments and house prices and between residential investments and business
investments match the data in sign but are—at odds to the data—close to one.
An earlier analysis of risk premia in a production economy with housing, habits, and
adjustments costs, which is similar to our extension of the Jermann (1998) model is pre-
sented in Jaccard (2011). However, different from our work and in contrast to JKKST and
Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Jaccard (2011) considers data where the return on housing
is markedly smaller than the return on equity. His empirical targets are based on Piazzesi
et al. (2007) who assume that the house price index grows with the price index of residen-
tial investments, whereas Davis and Heathcote (2007) and Knoll et al. (2017) show that
the main driver for increasing house prices are land prices. Moreover, different from the
present paper Jaccard (2011) does not focus on returns on total risk. Lastly, Jaccard (2011)
models superficial habits which have no intratemporal effect and the habit parameter is
close to one.2 The economic plausibility of both assumptions is questionable.
To the best of our knowledge, more general risk premia have not been investigated in
production economies with disaster risk up to this date.
Favilukis et al. (2017) study a two-sector production economy with aggregated and
idiosyncratic income risk and use this framework in order to explain the boom-bust cycle
in the first decade of this century. In their model, incomplete markets produce sizable risk
premia for returns on equity and housing. While the model can match the Sharpe ratio
of equity, the mean and the standard deviation of the return on equity turn out too small.
Moreover, the return on housing is twice as large as the return on equity, which contrasts
the data. Due to heterogeneity, there is no comparable measure for the volatility of returns
on housing.
The risk usually associated with housing wealth is potentially of a more idiosyncratic
nature than the risk from equity.3 In the present paper, we do not consider such differ-
2Jaccard (2011) sets the habit parameter implicitly to one and only calibrates the habit persistence. With
stationary variables the value of the habit parameter equals the reciprocal of the growth factor (=0.995).
3While JKKST report a standard deviation of 3.38 percent for the aggregated return on housing in the US
data, Flavin and Yamashita (2002) as well as Landvoigt et al. (2015) find a standard deviation of the
individual’s return on housing of 14 percent. Hence, one potential approach to explain the different
Sharpe ratios between equity and housing found in the aggregated data may be the idiosyncratic nature
of the risk associated with housing.
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ences in the typical nature of risks. Similarly, the models abstract from other asset specific
characteristics such as liquidity, transaction costs and search and matching frictions. In-
stead, we choose to face the aggregated data from JKKST throughout with a representative
agent framework with complete markets. In this regard we understand our study as a first
exploration of i) the asset pricing and business cycle characteristics which can already be
explained within an elementary representative agent framework with complete markets,
of ii) the characteristics for which such a framework becomes insufficient, and of iii) the
reasons why a more sophisticated framework which helps to further differentiate between
the assets is required for the characteristics in ii). Concerning i) we find that the model
with disaster risk allows us to generate a Sharpe ratio which is substantially larger than
the value previously confronted with for equity and which is close to the Sharpe ratio that
is observed for housing. Moreover, the model can explain different means and volatilities
of the risky assets while it still maintains a good fit to business cycle statistics. However,
in regard to ii) the main shortcoming of the framework is that it cannot generate different
Sharpe ratios of the risky assets. Different Sharpe ratios require different correlations be-
tween premia and the stochastic discount factor. Yet, in all of the models considered in the
present paper, the return rates of the two risky assets are far too strongly correlated. We
conclude, that further adjustments which help to disentangle this correlation are necessary.
From here on the papers reads as follows. In section 2 we first present the stylized facts
on which we focus in the remainder of the paper. Section 3 presents and discusses the non-
disaster economies, and section 4 introduces and discusses the economies with disaster
risk. The paper concludes with section 5 and more detailed derivations are collected in
the appendix.
2 STYLIZED FACTS
We start with the presentation of stylized facts which characterize historical data on busi-
ness cycles, housing and asset prices and which the literature has identified as key facts
that are commonly valid for most countries over longer time periods (see e.g. JKKST for
asset prices and Davis and Nieuwerburgh (2015) for housing and business cycles). In Ta-
bles 1 and 2 we provide a summary of these stylized facts for the US (1970-2015), the UK
(1969-2015), France (1980-2015), and Japan (1963-2015) while Appendix A provides
the results for additional countries. Asset price statistics were computed from annual data
from the JKKST database while business cycle statistics are shown for quarterly data from
the OECD.stats library.1.
First, the upper part of Table 1 displays the mean return rates on bills, on equity, on
housing and on total risk, and the standard deviations of the return rates are found in the
lower part of the table. We observe a low risk-free return rate between 0.98 percent in
Japan and 2.24 percent in France together with a low standard deviation (2.3-3.7). Note,
however, that bills are not totally risk-free and, hence, only provide an upper bound proxy
for the true risk-free return rate. The return on equity is between 5.86 percent in Japan
and 9.61 percent in France and leads to equity premia between 4.88 percent and 7.37
percent. In all countries, the average return on housing turns out moderately smaller than
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Table 1: Returns, premiums and second moments
RE RH RT R f EP HP T P SRE SRH SRT
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27 0.36 1.01 0.75
UK 8.00 7.00 7.47 1.56 6.44 5.44 5.91 0.27 0.61 0.69
FRA 9.61 5.78 6.61 2.24 7.37 3.54 4.37 0.31 0.57 0.59
JPA 5.86 5.54 6.19 0.98 4.88 4.56 5.21 0.24 0.7 0.65
σ(RE) σ(RH) σ(RT ) σ(R f ) σ(EP) σ(HP) σ(T P)
USA 16.71 3.78 6.90 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
UK 23.41 9.64 8.44 3.73 24.27 8.88 8.62
FRA 24.11 5.52 6.95 2.55 23.98 6.18 7.39
JPA 20.15 6.53 8.10 2.53 19.94 6.47 8.03
Notes: Mean percentage returns on equity (RE), housing (RH), total risk (RT ) and bills (R f ) as well as the
equity premium (EP), the housing premium (HP), and the total risk premium (T P). The corresponding
standard deviations σ(X ) as well as the Sharpe ratios of equity (SRE), of housing (SRH) and of total risk
(SRT ). Periods: USA 1970-2015, United Kingdom 1969-2015, France 1980-2015, and Japan 1963-2015.
Data from JKKST, own calculations.















USA 1.52 2.91 6.85 2.03 0.67 0.07 0.72 0.64
UK 1.58 2.68 5.56 4.85 0.51 0.16 0.69 0.71
FRA 0.95 2.75 3.17 3.19 0.65 0.64 0.81 0.48
JPA 1.59 2.41 3.84 2.70 0.31 0.27 0.45 0.55
Notes: Business cycle statistics are from quarterly logged per capita hp-filtered (1600) data. σx is the
standard deviation of x , r xy the correlation between x and y . RESI=residential investment, BUSI=non-
residential investment, Ph house prices. Periods: USA: 1970-2015, , United Kingdom 1969-2015, France
1980-2015 Japan 1963-2015. Data: See Appendix A, own calculations.
the average return on equity, and housing premia between 3.54 percent in France and 5.44
percent in the UK can be observed. The difference between the two risky returns/premia
is the smallest in Japan with just 0.32 percentage-points and the largest in France with
3.83 percentage-points. For the US and the UK the differences are 1.43 percentage-points
and 1.00 percentage-points, respectively.4 Moreover, in the US and the UK the return on
total risk is approximately the average of the two risky return rates. In France the return
on total risk is close to the smaller return on housing while in Japan the return on total
risk exceeds the decomposed return rates on both risky assets.
While equity shows moderately larger returns than housing, on the downside the return
rates on equity are two to four times as volatile as the return rates on housing. Both risky
returns are least volatile in the US with standard deviations of 16.7 and 3.78, respectively,
while the largest standard deviations are observed in France (24.11) for equity and in the
4The difference between the return rates in France is closer to the value in the other countries in the time
periods chosen by JST (1963-2015 and 1870-2015). Our French data set starts in 1980 due to missing
data for the business cycle statistics.
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UK (9.65) for housing. In all countries, the standard deviation of returns on total risk is also
significantly lower than the standard deviation of returns on equity, and premia are almost
identically as volatile as return rates. Finally, in all countries the Sharpe ratio of housing
exceeds the Sharpe ratio of equity significantly, and the Sharpe ratio of total risk is close
to the Sharpe ratio of housing. Summing up, we observe the following characteristics for
return rates: i) a risk-free rate in the range of 1-2.2 percent together with a low volatility,
ii) return rates on equity moderately larger than returns on housing, iii) premia on risky
returns over 3 percent, iii) return rates and premia on equity which are at least twice as
volatile as return rates and premia on housing and on total risk, and iv) a Sharpe ratio of
housing significantly larger than the Sharpe ratio of equity and similar to the Sharpe ratio
of total risk.
Second, Table 2 shows the stylized facts from the housing and the business cycle liter-
ature. We observe that GDP has a standard deviation of approximately 1.5-1.6 percent
in the US, the UK and Japan while its standard deviation is slightly below 1 percent in
France. In the US and the UK residential investments are twice as volatile as business in-
vestments while the difference between the two volatilities is moderately smaller in Japan
and significantly smaller in France.5 In all four countries the standard deviation of busi-
ness investment lies between 2.4 and 2.9 percent and house prices are pro-cyclical. GDP,
house prices, residential and business investment co-move and the lowest correlation is ob-
served between business and residential investments. In short, sub-aggregates and house
prices co-move pro-cyclically. Usually the literature additionally considers lagged cross-
correlations with residential investments since residential investments lead the business
cycle in the US. However, Kydland et al. (2016) show that this fact is unique to the US and
Canada which is why we omit lead-lag-patterns here.
Next to the four countries discussed in this section, Appendix A shows that we also
observe the same stylized facts in most other countries.
3 ECONOMIES WITH NON-DISASTER RISK
In this section, we add housing to influential approaches to explain the equity premium
puzzle in production economies. We start with an adaption of the Jermann (1998) model
with habit formation and capital adjustment costs in line with the ’q’ theory (model A). We
then extend the model by housing (model B). In a next step, we separate the production of
residential investments from the production of the consumption good and business invest-
ments. The two sectors are subject to limited sectoral capital mobility similar to Boldrin
et al. (2001) and Fehrle (2019). We consider the cases of exogenous labor (model C),
endogenous and fully mobile labor (model D), and endogenous labor subject to limited
sectoral labor mobility (model E).
5For most continental European countries we observe the same relation as in France.
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3.1 Housing with Jermann (1998)
Model A: Our study starts with the seminal work of Jermann (1998) with habits in utility,
adjustment costs in capital and exogenous labor decisions. Our variation of the model
deviates from its original treatment only in that we consider exogenous habits that are out
of the household’s control.
Model B: We proceed to extend the Jermann (1998) model by housing. The household
draws utility from housing Ht and consumption Ct , and both are subject to habit forma-
tion. Habits Xht , X ∈ {C , H}, are exogenous and evolve according to Xht = χX X t−1. Labor
supply remains exogenous. Output Yt is produced with capital Kt and is subject to labor
augmenting technical progress growing at the rate ay in the long run, and to productivity
shocks Zt following an AR(1)-process, ln Zt+1 = ρy ln Zt + εt+1, εt ∼ iidN(0,σ2y). Con-
sumption, business investment It , and residential investment Dt are homogeneous goods.
We stick to the assumption of capital adjustment costs as in Jermann (1998).6 A fixed
factor normalized to one, namely land, affects the transformation from residential invest-
ment to new houses. The planner’s problem in a centralized economy therefore reads as
follows:7
max






((Ct − Cht)µc(Ht −Hht)µh)1−η − 1
1−η ,





Yt = Ct + It + Dt ,






Ht+1 = (1−δh)Ht + D1−φt ,
(1)




ϕ2, ϕ1 > 0, ϕ2 ∈ R.
We follow Davis and Heathcote (2005) and define GDP by GDPt = Yt + MRSH,Ct Ht ,
where MRSH,Ct = (µh/µc)(Ct − Cht)/(Ht − Hht) denotes the marginal rate of substitution
between housing and consumption so that its product with the current housing stock yields
the implicit rent from housing. Finally, the return rate RE,t+1 on investment in productive
capital, the return rate RH,t+1 on housing, the return rate RT,t+1 on total risk, and the risk-
6In an earlier version of the paper we assumed investment adjustment costs as in Christiano et al. (2005).
Fehrle (2019) shows for the Davis and Heathcote (2005) framework that these adjustment costs account
better for the lag pattern of business investment. However, to remain in line with Jermann (1998),
Gourio (2012) and our disaster risk framework, we changed to capital adjustment costs. Besides the
lead-lag structure, which is beyond the scope, changes are minor.
7See Appendix C for details.
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free rate R f ,t are given by
1+ RE,t+1 =














αYt+1 − It+1 + qt+1Kt+2 + (MRSH,Ct+1 + (1−δh)Pht+1)Ht+1
qt Kt+1 + Pht+1Ht+1
,




where qt = 1/Φ′(It/Kt) is Tobin’s q, rt = αy(Yt/Kt) is the rental rate of capital which
equals the marginal product of capital, Λt = µc(Ct − Cht)µc(1−η)−1(Ht − Hht)µh(1−η) is the
marginal utility of consumption and Pht = D
φ
t /(1−φ) denotes house prices which equal
the reciprocal of the residential investment’s marginal rate of production of new houses.
Calibration A: We identify one period in the model with one quarter in the data and
closely follow the calibration in Jermann (1998). More precisely, we set the coefficient
of relative risk aversion to η = 5, the elasticity of capital in the production function to
αy = 0.36 and the quarterly trend growth rate to ay = 1.005 as in Jermann (1998).
We slightly deviate from the value of δk = 0.025 used in Jermann (1998) and, in fore-
sight of model B, instead adjust the depreciation rate of capital from Nguyen (2018),
who strips down the Davis and Heathcote (2005) model, to quarterly data which yields
δk = 0.022. The autocorrelation parameter and the conditional standard deviation of the
AR(1)-process governing productivity are pinned down to ρy=0.95 and σy=0.01. In line
with Jermann (1998), we choose the remaining parameters of the model, i.e. the house-
hold’s time preference β , the habit parameter χc, and the parameter κ controlling the
elasticity of the investment capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s q, in such way to closely
replicate the risk-free rate, the equity premium and the relative volatility of business in-
vestment to GDP from the US data. We minimize the (unweighted) sum of squared de-
viations between the targets in the model and the values in the data over a grid covering
β? := βa1−ηy ∈ [0.99; 0.999],χc ∈ [0; 0.95] and κ ∈ [0;6.25] where the number of grid-
point is 10, 10 and 50, respectively. The resulting values are summarized in Column A of
Table 3.
Calibration B: In order to keep the different variations of the model comparable and in
order to emphasize the effects of introducing housing into the Jermann (1998) model,
all parameters from model A also remain at the same values in model B.8 In particular,
we do not re-optimize the previously ”free” parameters for model B in order to match the
8Note however, that η now is the coefficient of relative risk aversion with respect to the composite good
and no longer with respect to consumption only. Moreover, now β? := βa(µc+(1−φ)µh)(1−η).
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Table 3: Calibration
A B C D / E Description
β? 0.994 0.994 0.999 0.999 discount factor
η 5 5 5 5 coefficient of relative risk aversion
µ∗)c – 0.81 0.81 0.53 weight of consumption in composite good
µ
∗)
h – 0.19 0.19 0.12 weight of housing in composite good
χc 0.95 0.95 0.825 0.825 habit parameter of consumption
χh – 0.95 0.825 0.825 habit parameter of housing
χn – – – 0.95 habit parameter of leisure
ay 1.005 1.005 1.005 1.005 growth rate (y sector)
ad – – 1.002 1.002 growth rate (d sector)
φ – 0.106 0.106 0.106 share of land in housing
αy 0.36 0.36 0.25 0.25 capital share in production (y sector)
αd – – 0.20 0.20 capital share in production (d sector)
κy 4.05 4.05 6.25 6.25 elasticity of Tobin’s q (y sector)
κd – – 1.25 1.25 elasticity of Tobin’s q (d sector)
δk 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 rate of capital depreciation (y sector)
δh – 0.009 0.009 0.009 rate of housing depreciation (d sector)
σy 0.01 0.01 0.0094 0.0094 conditional standard deviation of log TFP (y sector)
ρy 0.95 0.95 0.966 0.966 autocorrelation of log TFP (y sector)
σd – – 0.0172 0.0172 conditional standard deviation of log TFP (d sector)
ρd – – 0.923 0.923 autocorrelation of log TFP (d sector)
Notes: ∗) Endogenous by the model. A: Jermann (1998) adaption. B. A + Housing in utility. C. B + two
sectors. D: C + endogenous labor. E: D + limited sectoral labor mobility.
(additionally available) targets. However, re-optimizing would not change the following
main results.
We calibrate the additional parameters from housing in model B as follows. First, we
also borrow the depreciation rate of housing δh = 0.009 from the same source as we
did δk. Second, we follow Grossmann et al. (2019) and pin down the weights µc and
µh of consumption and of housing in the consumption bundle such way that the ratio of
expenditures on housing to total consumption is 19 percent on the balanced growth path
and so that µc+µh = 1 holds. Third, the habit parameter for housing is set to the same high
value of χh = 0.95 as for consumption. Finally, we take the value of the land parameter
φ = 0.106 from Davis and Heathcote (2005).
Results: The return rates as well as the business cycle statistics for our variation of the
Jermann (1998) model (row A) and for the model extended by housing (row B) are sum-
marized in tables 4 and 5. We compute the annualized mean return rates and the annual-
ized standard deviation of return rates from a simulation of 100,000 periods. The second
moments of the business cycle are reported as the average outcome from 100 repeated
simulations of HP-filtered time series of the model’s equilibrium outcomes, each for 180
periods. The model solution is obtained from a second-order perturbation method.
First, as shown by Jermann (1998), model A is able to generate a sizeable equity pre-
mium and a risk-free rate which are close to the values observed in the data. Moreover, we
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Table 4: Returns, premiums and second moments
RE RH RT R f EP HP T P SRE SRH SRT
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27 0.36 1.01 0.75
Model
A 7.66 – – 1.55 6.05 – – 0.25 – –
B 4.61 4.39 4.52 4.26 0.34 0.13 0.26 0.07 0.07 0.07
C 4.71 4.45 4.56 0.38 4.31 4.06 4.16 0.21 0.21 0.21
D 2.57 2.47 2.51 2.05 0.51 0.42 0.46 0.07 0.07 0.07
E 4.88 4.61 4.72 1.50 3.34 3.07 3.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
σ(RE) σ(RH) σ(RT ) σ(R f ) σ(EP) σ(HP) σ(T P)
USA 16.71 3.78 6.9 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
Model
A 25.17 – – 6.19 24.22 – –
B 5.01 2.07 3.79 0.73 4.95 1.93 3.71
C 21.83 20.73 21.19 8.08 20.26 19.06 19.57
D 7.18 5.95 6.44 1.47 7.03 5.76 6.27
E 22.60 21.45 21.92 13.39 18.19 16.72 17.33
Notes: Mean percentage returns on equity (RE), housing (RH), total risk (RT ) and bills (R f ), as well as the
equity premium (EP), the housing premium (HP), and the total risk premium (T P). The corresponding
standard deviations σ(X ) as well as the Sharpe ratios of equity (SRE), of housing (SRH) and of total risk
(SRT ). We employ a second order perturbation and simulated time series with 100,000 periods. A: Jermann
(1998) adaption. B: A + Housing. C: B + two sectors. D: C + endogenous labor. E: D + limited sectoral
labor mobility.
can also closely replicate the volatility of business investments relative to the volatility of
GDP. On the other hand, the return rates, especially the risk-free rate, turn out too volatile
in the model.
However, once housing is introduced into the model, all risk premia—on equity, housing
and total risk—turn out close to zero, and the volatility of return rates is reduced drasti-
cally. Introducing housing into the model provides the household with an option to better
insure against fluctuations in his marginal utility in the same way as discussed by Uhlig
(2007) for endogenous labor decisions. Since consumption and residential investment
are homogeneous, the household is now able to reduce residential investments in favor
of consumption in response to negative productivity shocks. The relatively small elastic-
ity (µh = 0.14) combined with a small depreciation rate of housing (δh = 0.009) favour
the household’s possibilities to smooth his consumption bundle across states with different
realizations of the shock. In consequence, the stochastic discount factor becomes far less
volatile so that risk premia almost disappear. Moreover, the household’s efforts to smooth
his consumption bundle by adequately adjusting residential investment and consumption
also show up in the second moments of the business cycle. The volatility of residential
investment in the model is twice as large as in the data and the demand of residential
goods moves procyclical. Further, residential investments are positively correlated with
house prices and the other variables considered.
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USA 1.52 2.91 6.85 2.03 0.67 0.07 0.72 0.64
Model
A 1.25 2.91 – – – – – –
B 0.96 0.74 11.63 1.16 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.96
C 2.27 1.04 0.96 4.42 −0.03 0.00 0.08 0.97
D 1.45 0.69 4.25 2.37 0.65 0.77 0.85 0.90
E 1.96 0.96 2.10 3.97 −0.06 0.08 0.36 0.89
Notes: σx is the standard deviation of x , r
x
y the correlation between x and y . Business cycle statistics from
HP-filtered (1600) times series. We employ a second order perturbation and report the average outcomes
from repeated simulations with 180 periods. A: Jermann (1998) adaption. B: A + Housing. C: B + two
sectors. D: C + endogenous labor. E: D + limited sectoral labor mobility.
3.2 Moving to Boldrin et al. (2001)
Sectoral frictions with exogenous labor supply: In the previous subsection, the house-
hold can nearly perfectly hedge against consumption fluctuations since the marginal rate
of transformation between residential investment and consumption was one. We restrict
this option in the following by moving to a two-sector model—separating production of
the residential good from production of the consumption good—with frictions in factor
mobility. In particular, capital is assumed immobile between the two sectors. The re-
sulting model is similar to Nguyen (2018). We start with exogenous labor supply before
discussing the effects of endogenous labor supply and labor supply which is contracted
sector-specifically one period ahead as proposed by Boldrin et al. (2001).
Model C: The household’s utility and the law of motion of the housing stock remain the
same as in (1). The model economy consists of two sectors indexed by y and d. The
sector y produces a homogeneous consumption and business investment good while the
residential investment good is produced in sector d. Sector-specific technical progress
grows at the rate ax in sector x , x ∈ {y, d}, and both sectors are subject to sector-
specific and uncorrelated productivity shocks Zx t governed by AR(1)-processes, ln Zx ,t+1 =
ρx ln Zx ,t+εx ,t+1, εx ,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2x). The household is confronted with capital adjustment
costs in both sectors and, once installed, capital is totally immobile. The household’s prob-
13
lem in a centralized economy reads as follows:
max






((Ct − Cht)µc(Ht −Hht)µh)1−η − 1
1−η ,
s.t. Yt = ay
(1−αy )t Zy t K
αy
y t ,
Yt = Ct + It ,
Dt = ad
(1−αd )t Zd t K
αd
d t ,
It = Id t + I y t ,












Ht+1 = (1−δh)Ht + D1−φt .
(2)
where η,αy ,αd , ay , ad ,µc,µh > 0, µc+µh = 1, β ,δk,δh ∈ (0,1), Φy(x) = ϕy,2+ ϕy,11−κy x1−κy ,
and Φd analogously.
GDP is now defined by GDPt = Yt + Pd t Dt + MRSH,Ct Ht where Pd t is the relative price
of residential investment goods. The return on housing remains the same as before but
with Pht = Pd t D
φ
t /(1−φ), while the return on equity is the weighted sum of the return on
capital in the two sectors, i.e. with the obvious adaption of notation from the one-sector
model
1+ RE,t+1 =
αy Yt+1 − I y,t+1 + qy,t+1Ky,t+2 +αd Pd,t+1Dt+1 − Id,t+1 + qd,t+1Kd,t+2
qy,t Ky,t+1 + qd,t Kd,t+1
.
The return on total risk is adjusted in an analogous way.
Calibration: The parameters η,φ,δk and δh remain at the same values they were pre-
viously set to in model B. Likewise, the weights µc and µh of consumption and housing
in the household’s utility are still pinned down by imposing that the ratio of expenditures
on housing to total consumption is 19 percent on the balanced path. In order to take the
two sector framework into account, we assume the same capital shares, αy and αd , as
in Nguyen (2018). Moreover, we also take the autocorrelation parameters ρy and ρd of
shocks to productivity in both sectors from Nguyen (2018). The standard deviations of
innovations are chosen in such way that their ratio is kept the same as in Nguyen (2018)
while the level is adjusted to reproduce a standard deviation of GDP comparable to models
A and B and to the data. As already noted, we abstract from technology spillovers.9 While
Nguyen (2018) does not consider long-run growth, we choose ay = 1.005 and ad = 1.002
to match the annual output growth rates in the two sectors as reported by Davis and Heath-




The remaining parameters are set again in such way that the (unweighted) sum of
squared deviations between our targets in the model and in the data is minimized. The list
of targets now includes the risk-free rate, the equity premium, the housing premium as well
as the relative standard deviations and the correlations from the business cycle statistics
in Table 2, all for US data. Our grid covers β? := βa(µc+(1−φ)µhαd )(1−η)y a
(1−φ)(1−αd )µh(1−η)
d
∈ [0.99, 0.999], χc,χh ∈ [0.7, 0.95], and κy ,κd ∈ [0.625, 6.25] and is built-up from
10×5×5×10×10 grid-points. A summary of the model’s calibration is given in column
C of Table 3.
Results: The return rates and business cycle statistics in the two-sector model are shown
in row C of tables 4 and 5. First, restricting the household’s option to smooth his con-
sumption bundle by switching from residential investments to consumption has the desired
effect on asset prices. Compared to model B, risk premia in the model again increase sub-
stantially. The model generates an equity premium of 4.31 percent which is about one and
a half percentage-points below the value found in the data while the premium on housing
in the model is moderately lower at 4.06 percent and is a half percentage-point below its
empirical counterpart. Similar to the empirical findings, the model yields a premium of
total risk in between the two premia of equity and housing. The model also reproduces a
low risk-free rate but fails to explain the observed volatilities of asset prices. The standard
deviation of the risk-free rate exceeds its empirical value by a factor of four, return rates on
housing turn out too volatile by a factor of almost six, and the volatility of returns on total
risk is too large by a factor of almost three. The model, hence, cannot explain a Sharpe
ratio of housing which is markedly larger than that of equity.
The restriction of the household’s option in the allocation between consumption and res-
idential investments has a negative effect on the business cycle statistics. While in model
B the household’s preference to smooth the consumption bundle induces procyclical co-
movement in the demand of residential goods, the positive correlation between house
prices and residential investment now disappears. Moreover, the assumption of uncorre-
lated shocks in the two sectors prevents co-movements between residential and business
investment. Since consumption and business investments account for the largest part of
GDP, residential investments and GDP fluctuate almost uncorrelatedly.
Endogenous labor supply: Allowing the household to adjust labor supply in response
to productivity shocks, again opens a channel which admits to smooth the consumption
bundle more evenly across different states of shocks. As pointed out by Uhlig (2007), risk
premia in the model should suffer.
Model D: Hours worked in the two sectors, Ny t and Nd t , augment the production func-
tions and aggregated hours Nt = Nd t + Ny t cannot exceed the time endowment of the
household which is normalized to one. Accordingly, leisure (1 − Nt) is added to the
household’s utility function which is parameterized as in Davis and Heathcote (2005)
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but extended by habit formation in leisure equivalent to consumption and housing, i.e.
Nht := 1−χn(1− Nt−1). The changes to the household’s problem from (2) are as follows
max






((Ct − Cht)µc(Ht −Hht)µh((1− Nt)− (1− Nht))µn)1−η − 1
1−η ,






Yt = Ct + It ,










where now µc,µh,µn > 0, µc +µh +µn = 1.
Calibration: Again, in order to place emphasis on the effects of introducing endogenous
labor decisions to the model, all parameters from model C remain at the same values as
before. We only adjust the weights µc,µh and µn in the household’s utility in such way that
i) the housing expenditures remain at 19 percent of total consumption expenditures and
ii) he works one third of his time endowment on average. Moreover, the habit parameter
χn is set to its upper bound 0.95 of plausible values. Column D/E of Table 3 outlines the
calibration.
Results: Row D of Table 4 confirms the already expected consequences of endogenous
labor supply for the return rates in the model. Compared to model C, the return rates on
equity, housing, and total risk, decrease and become significantly less volatile. In conse-
quence, risk premia drastically fall by a magnitude of order.
Endogenous labor supply reintroduces the possibility for adjustments in the allocation
of the consumption bundle after the shock’s realization. The household is able to adjust
his working hours intersectorally and can shift conveniently between consumption and
residential investments. In consequence, the discussed demand effect for residential in-
vestment recurs as can be seen in row D of Table 5. The model can explain the volatilities of
residential investment and house prices fairly well while business investment remains too
involatile. Moreover, the model can also generate the positive correlations between house
prices, residential investment, and GDP found in the data. Yet, residential and business
investment are correlated too strongly.
Limited labor mobility: Two well-known extensions that help to revive risk premia when
labor decisions are endogenous are limited sectoral mobility as described by Boldrin et al.
(2001) and wage rigidities as proposed by Uhlig (2007). To keep in line with the present
framework of limited factor mobility, we focus on the former.
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Model E: The household is now unable to adapt his labor supply in response to technol-
ogy shocks but is committed to working hours that are contracted sector-specifically one
period ahead. Nothing else changes so that the household’s problem remains as in (3)
with the exception that he now optimizes with regard to Nyt+1 and Ndt+1 while taking Nyt
and Ndt as given in any period t.
Calibration: We stick to the calibration in column D/E of Table 3 from the previous model
D with a frictionless labor market.
Results: Return rates from the two-sector model with limited labor mobility are summa-
rized in row E of Table 4. Limited labor mobility provides a mixture of the two previous
cases with exogenous labor supply in model C and with endogenous and frictionless labor
supply in model D. Hence, risk premia increase significantly compared to model D but
remain below the values from model C. Moreover, the standard deviation of the risk-free
rate turns out too large by a factor of almost six and the return rates on housing and on
total risk are more than three times too volatile.
Table 5 shows in its row E that the model can generate positive correlations between
business and residential investment, between GDP and residential investment and between
GDP and house prices which are all close to the values in the data. However, the attempt
to explain risk premia by shutting down the channel that enables the household to smooth
his consumption bundle comes at the cost of too involatile residential investment which is
no longer positively correlated with house prices.
3.3 Summary and discussion
In the classic Jermann (1998) model, habits increase the household’s desire to smooth
consumption of the composite good. However, if the model is extended by housing in a
one sector framework, optimal adjustment of the allocation of output to consumption and
residential investment enables the household to insure himself more conveniently against
fluctuations in the consumption bundle. A small elasticity of housing in the consumption
bundle and the rather small depreciation rate of housing favor the behavior. A similar ar-
gument holds in a multi-sector framework with perfect labor markets where the household
can adapt the allocation of hours worked in each sector in response to productivity shocks.
While this option implies that the marginal utility does not fluctuate enough between dif-
ferent realizations of the shock and therefore yields risk premia close to zero, it induces, on
the other hand, a demand effect which results in positive correlations between residential
investment and house prices and in standard deviations in business cycle statistics that are
close to the data.
Risk premia can be increased through sectoral frictions as e.g. limited capital and labor
mobility. Yet, this comes at the cost of losing the empirical co-movements of residential
investment. Therefore, we conclude that the present framework cannot simultaneously re-
produce asset pricing statistics and business cycle statistics as observed in the data. More-
over, the models fail to explain the different volatilities and Sharpe ratios between the two
17





4 SRE SRH rM ,EP rM ,HP rEP,HP
Data
USA – 0.36 1.01 – – 0.19
Model
B 0.07 0.07 0.07 −0.99 −0.99 1.00
C 0.23 0.21 0.21 −0.92 −0.92 1.00
D 0.08 0.07 0.07 −0.98 −0.96 0.99
E 0.23 0.18 0.18 −0.80 −0.80 1.00
Notes: SRE : annualized Sharpe ratio of equity, SRH : annualized Sharpe ratio of housing, rX ,Y : correlation
between variables X and Y where Mt+1 : stochastic discount factor, EPt+1 := RE,t+1 − R f ,t : ex-post equity
premium, HPt+1 := RH,t+1 − R f ,t : ex-post housing premium.
risky assets throughout. In all models and contrary to the data, the mean as well as the
standard deviation of returns on total risk are the weighted averages from the returns on
equity and housing.
In order to provide some additional reasoning for the models’ failures in regard to asset








Mt+1(RH,t+1 − R f ,t)

= 0,
where Mt+1 denotes the models’ respective stochastic discount factor. Taking unconditional
expectations, the equality also holds unconditionally for the models’ stationary distribu-
tions. Hence, for both assets X ∈ {E, H},
E [Mt+1]E

RX ,t+1 − R f ,t

= −Cov Mt+1, RX ,t+1 − R f ,t

=


























Mt+1, RX ,t+1 − R f ,t

. (4)
The first factor on the right hand side defines an upper bound and is common to both
assets, while different correlations between risk premia and the stochastic discount factor
between the two assets are necessary in order to explain different Sharpe ratios. More
precisely, in order to match the different Sharpe ratios observed in the data, the correla-
tion between premia on housing and the stochastic discount factor must be (in absolute
value) approximately 3 times as large as the correlation between premia on equity and the
stochastic discount.
We summarize the decomposition of the Sharpe ratios provided by equation (4) in Ta-
ble 6. First, we observe that in all models the two risky return rates are almost perfectly
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correlated and, hence, the correlations with the stochastic discount factor are nearly iden-
tical. By (4), the Sharpe ratios of the two risky assets must also coincide. Although models
C and E can replicate the empirically observed Sharpe ratio of equity fairly well, we can
conclude that they achieve this result in an unfitting way. In order to leave room for a sig-
nificantly larger Sharpe ratio of housing, the correlation between the stochastic discount
factor and the premia on equity would have to be substantially smaller (in absolute value).
The smaller correlation rM ,EP would then have to be offset with a larger standard deviation
of the stochastic discount factor to keep the equity premium and its volatility the same,
and less volatile premia on housing would be necessary in order to still match their mean.
The models B and D, which fail to generate sizeable risk premia and Sharpe ratios, suffer
from a too low volatility of the stochastic discount factor—the agent can adjust his deci-
sions sufficiently well in response to shocks in order to keep fluctuations in his marginal
utility small.
Moreover, the nearly perfect correlation between the return rates of the two risky assets
also implies that the mean and the standard deviation of the total portfolio are the weighted
averages of the two assets. Contrary to the observations from the stylized facts, the Sharpe
ratio of total risk must coincide with the Sharpe ratios of the two risky assets.10
Fehrle (2019) discusses the implications of a larger share of land in the production of
new houses. He shows that in the in the Davis and Heathcote (2005) framework the ability
to account for co-moving economic activity, especially for the correlation between residen-
tial investment and house prices, can be improved. We follow Fehrle (2019) and repeat
our computations for φ = 0.3 which is the upper bound considered by Fehrle (2019). The
results are summarized in Appendix B.11 We find that improvements in the business cycle
statistics are only marginal and effects on asset return statistics are ambiguous.
4 HOUSING WITH DISASTER RISK
In this section we move to another popular approach to explain risk premia. We combine
an otherwise standard RBC model with housing and with key elements from the literature
on economic disasters. The model is based on Gourio (2012). It is extended by housing
and features a time-varying risk for disasters which reduce productivity and which also
partly destroy the stocks of productive capital and residential structures. We choose to
keep the model as simple as possible and provide easily traceable insights of the model’s
mechanisms instead of a richer framework that would supply more degrees of freedom to
10For any non-stochastic share w ∈ (0, 1) of equity in total wealth, if rEP,HP = 1, then
σ(T P) = (w2σ2(EP) + (1−w)2σ2(HP) + 2w(1−w)rEP,HPσ(EP)σ(HP))
1
2 = wσ(EP) + (1−w)σ(HP),
and, if additionally SRE = SRH , then also
SRT =
wσ(EP)
wσ(EP) + (1−w)σ(HP)SRE +
(1−w)σ(HP)
wσ(EP) + (1−w)σ(HP)SRH = SRE = SRH .
11Favilukis et al. (2017) proceed similarly by setting the land share equal 0.25.
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match the data. A more detailed presentation of the model, including our solution method,
is delegated to Appendix D.
4.1 Model
The basic framework of the model follows the one-sector model from the previous section.
The household derives utility from a composite good C̃t that is represented by a Cobb-





t (1− Nt)1−µc−µh .
We assume that the household’s preferences over streams of the composite good are de-
scribed by a recursive utility function, as introduced by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil















whereψ is the household’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and γ is the coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion (RRA). Note however that γ and ψ describe the household’s
RRA and EIS with respect to the composite good C̃ . Since the composite good aggre-
gator is of the Cobb-Douglas type, the consumption-based RRA is given by µcγ and the
consumption-based EIS reads 11−µc(1−1/ψ) .
12 For easier notation we define Vt := Ṽ
1−1/ψ
t
which satisfies the recursion
Vt = (1− β)C̃
1− 1ψ





where we use, similar to Caldara et al. (2012), the notation
θ := 1− 1− γ
1− 1ψ
.
In the case where θ = 0, the RRA equals the reciprocal of the EIS and the household’s
utility reduces to the ‘classical’ expected discounted sum of within period CRRA utilities.
Hence, θ can also be interpreted as the deviation from this ‘classic’ case.
Output Yt is produced with the help of capital Kt and labor Nt according to the Cobb-
Douglas production function Yt = Kαt (At Nt)
1−α where At denotes labor augmenting tech-
nological progress which grows stochastically as will be outlined below. We stick to the
assumption that investments in the productive capital stock are met with adjustment costs
as in Jermann (1998). Output is allocated between the homogenous goods consumption,
business investments, and investments in residential structures. Residential structures
must be combined with land, which acts as adjustment costs to residential investments,
before entering the stock of houses.
12See also Swanson (2012) and Heiberger and Ruf (2019).
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Additionally, the economy faces a great disaster risk. Disasters are introduced through
an exogenous shock in form of a binary variable bt which indicates disasters in case of
bt = 1 while bt = 0 in normal times. Following Gourio (2012), disasters appear with
time-varying probability and size. More specifically, we assume that
P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 0) =min{pt , 1}, P(bt+1 = 0|bt = 0) = 1−min{pt , 1}
where the log of pt follows an AR(1)-process
ln pt+1 = (1−ρp) ln p̄+ρp ln pt + εp,t+1, εp,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2p). (5)
Additionally, disasters remain persistent with probability no less than q ∈ (0,1) so that
P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 1) =max{q,min{pt , 1}}, P(bt+1 = 0|bt = 1) = 1−max{q, min{pt , 1}}.
On the one hand, disasters result in a decline of productivity by the factor 1− eωt+1 so that
technology grows stochastically according to
At+1 = At ae
zt+1+ωt+1 bt+1 ,
zt+1 = ρzzt + εz,t+1, εz,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2z ).
On the other hand, disasters also result in the destruction of a fraction 1 − eωt+1 of the
























Finally, the disaster size 1− eωt+1 also evolves stochastically according to
ωt := ω̄e
ω̂t ,







where ω̄ < 0. We slightly deviate from the treatment in Gourio (2012) in the specification
of the process governing the disaster size and allow autocorrelation but restrict outcomes
to ωt < 0 so that disasters always have negative effects. The specification is similar to
Fernández-Villaverde and Levintal (2018).13
13Gourio (2012) additionally considers a transitory component of disasters. We checked the effects of a
transitory shock component as well. Since we find that the effects for our targets are marginal, we omit
the transitory component for the sake of simplicity.
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Summing up, the household’s problem in a centralized economy reads as follows
max/min





Vt = (1− β)C̃
1− 1ψ


























Dt , It ≥ 0,
(7)
where K∗t+1 and H
∗
t+1 is the size of the stocks before bt+1 realizes and Φ remains defined as
before. We define GDP again as the sum of consumption, both investment types and the
implicit rent from housing.
Return Rates and Leverage The return rates on equity, housing and total risk are defined
by (see also Gourio (2012) and Heiberger (2018)):
1+ RE,t+1 = e
bt+1ωt+1



























Ct+1 − Ph,t+1D1−φt+1 + Ph,t+1H?t+2 + Yt+1 −Wt+1Nt+1 − It+1 + qt+1K?t+2
Ph,t H
?




where rt = α(Yt/Kt), Wt = (1−α)(Yt/Nt), qt = 1/Φ′(It/Kt) and MRSH,Ct = (µh/µc)(Ct/Ht)
are the marginal product of capital, the real wage rate, Tobin’s q and the marginal rate of
substitution between housing and consumption, respectively. Moreover, the risk-free rate
satisfies












(Et V 1−θt+1 )1/(1−θ )
−θ






However, R f ,t is the return rate of a real risk-free government bond which, as already
noted, does not have an equivalent empirical counterpart. We therefore follow Barro
(2006) and Gourio (2012) and assume that bonds in the model may also default dur-
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ing disasters. More concretely, we consider government (gb), corporate (cb) and housing
(hb) bonds which differ by their recovery rates Γx ,t during disasters, x ∈ {gb, cb,hb}. The
price Q(Tx )x ,t of such a bond with bond specific maturity Tx then satisfies the recursion
Q(Tx )x ,t = Et[Mt+1
 
1− bt+1 + bt+1Γx ,t+1

Q(Tx−1)x ,t+1 ], where Q
(0)
x ,t+1 ≡ 1.
The ex-post return rates from holding bonds with maturity Tx for one period are defined
by
1+ R(Tx )x ,t+1 :=
 





We assume that the rates at which bonds default during disasters are coupled to the
disaster size 1− eωt+1 via constant fractions χx ∈ [0, 1] so that
Γx ,t+1 = 1−χx(1− eωt+1).
Finally, since the return on equity in the data is calculated from stock returns, it includes
leverage. This does not hold for housing returns. To be in line with the data, we also
consider leveraged return rates in the model. More precisely, we assume that in each period
the constant fraction mcb ∈ [0,1) of the firm’s capital stock is financed by debt through
bonds which all have maturity Tcb. Since the Modigliani and Miller theorem holds, the





























Our analysis considers different variations of the model. We start with a variation of the
model, named F, which excludes housing before introducing housing into the model in
variation G. In models F and G disaster risk is time-varying in that both the probability
pt and the disaster size ωt follow stochastic processes (5) and (6), respectively. Model H
shuts down the stochastic effect for pt and model I for ωt while in model J both effects
are shut down.
First, the share α of capital in production and the depreciation rates δk and δh of produc-
tive capital and housing remain the same as in our variation of the Jermann (1998) model
with housing (model B). We increase the coefficient of RRA moderately to γ= 5.5 and set
the now disentangled EIS to ψ= 2 following Gourio (2012). We maintain our strategy to




β 0.995 discount factor
ψ 2 elasticity of intertemporal substitution
γ 5.5 coefficient of relative risk aversion
µ∗)c 0.30 weight of consumption in composite good
µ
∗)
h 0.07 weight of housing in composite good
α 0.36 capital share in production
φ 0.30 share of land in housing
κ 0.80 elasticity of Tobin’s q wrt. investment-capital ratio
δk 0.022 rate of capital depreciation
δh 0.009 rate of housing depreciation
ln a 0.005 growth rate
ρz 0.00 autocorrelation of log technology shock
ρω 0.00 autocorrelation of log disaster size
ρp 0.95 autocorrelation of log disaster probability
σz 0.01 conditional standard deviation of log technology shock
σω 0.67 conditional standard deviation of log disaster size
σp/
q
1−ρ2p 2.5 unconditional standard deviation of log disaster probability
ω̄ -0.067 disaster size
p̄/exp(
σ2p
2(1−ρ2p) ) 0.0079 mean disaster probability
q 0.93 probability for disaster persistence
χg b 0.20 default loss of government bonds as fraction of disaster size
χcb 0.38 default loss of corporate bonds as fraction of disaster size
Tg b 1 maturity of the government bond
Tcb 10 maturity of the corporate bond
mcb 0.37 corporate’s financial leverage
Notes: ∗) Endogenous by the model.
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housing account to 19 percent of his total consumption expenditures and that the house-
hold works one third of his time endowment on balanced growth (Model D/E). Moreover,
the average growth rate a of technology during normal times is also kept the same as be-
fore and corresponds to the value in Gourio (2012). We set ρz = 0 and σz = 0.01 so that
during normal times the stochastic process governing technological progress is identical
to the process for the permanent component of productivity in Gourio (2012). The share
of land in new houses is set to the upper bound φ = 0.3 from Fehrle (2019) in order to fit
the model closer to the data.14
The calibration of the ’free’ parameters β and κ and of the additional parameters from
the introduction of rare disasters is guided by Gourio (2012) and Fernández-Villaverde and
Levintal (2018) but moderately adjusted in order to fit the model closer to the data. More
precisely, we set β = 0.995 and κ= 0.8. Further, we follow Gourio (2012) and assume an
iid process for the disaster size, i.e. ρω = 0. We choose ω̄= −0.067 and σω = 0.67 which
implies a mean disaster size of approximately 8 percent. In comparison, the mean disaster
size of the transitory and permanent components combined is approximately 6 percent
in Gourio (2012). For the probability to enter a disaster, we choose a moderately larger
autocorrelation ρp = 0.95 and a moderately lower standard deviation σp = 2.5
q
1−ρ2p
instead of ρp = 0.9 and σp = 2.8
q
1−ρ2p in Gourio (2012). Finally, p̄ is set such way
that the average probability of entering a disaster is 0.72 percent—the same value used by
Gourio (2012)—while the persistence of disasters is pinned down to q = 0.93—moderately
above the value of q = 0.914 employed by Gourio (2012).
Lastly, we make the following assumptions for asset prices. Consistent with Barro (2006)
and Gourio (2012) the default loss of government bonds is 20 percent of the disaster
size, i.e. χgb = 0.2, while the default loss of corporate bonds is set to a higher value of
χcb = 0.38. We consider government bonds with maturity of one period since our empirical
counterpart are bills, and the maturity of corporate bonds is set to Tcb = 10. Gourio (2012)
reports financial leverage of approximately 30 percent in the data. However, he interprets
leverage in a broader way, i.e. also as operating leverage, and therefore chooses a larger
level of leverage of approximately 50 percent for the calibration of his model. Our value
of mcb = 0.37 lies in between.
4.3 Results
Table 8 presents the asset return statistics for unlevered equity, for housing and for a real
risk-free bond while Table 9 shows the return rates for a government bond with partial
default in disasters and for leveraged equity. The business cycle statistics are summarized
in Table 10. Note that we follow Gourio (2012) and, except for row G*, report statistics
which are computed from samples where no disasters appear.
First, comparing rows F and G reveals that the introduction of housing into the model has
only negligible effects on the return rates of unlevered and leveraged equity. The model (G)
can explain return rates on leveraged equity and on government bonds which are close to
14We present and discuss the results of model G with φ = 0.106 in Appendix B. Favilukis et al. (2017)
proceed similar by setting the land share equal to 0.1 and 0.25.
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Table 8: Simulated returns, premiums and second moments II (no default, no leverage)
RE RH RT R f EP HP T P SRE SRH SRT
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27 0.36 1.01 0.75
Model
F 4.6 – – 0.88 3.70 – – 0.90 – –
G 4.88 4.35 4.64 1.13 3.72 3.19 3.49 0.88 0.94 0.91
G∗ 3.31 2.8 3.08 −0.15 3.46 2.95 3.24 0.62 0.60 0.62
H 5.34 4.91 5.15 −1.25 6.66 6.21 6.46 5.33 8.51 6.33
I 4.41 4.04 4.25 2.32 2.06 1.69 1.90 0.64 0.71 0.68
J 4.70 4.42 4.58 1.33 3.34 3.06 3.22 2.67 4.43 3.19
σ(RE) σ(RH) σ(RT ) σ(R f ) σ(EP) σ(HP) σ(T P)
USA 16.71 3.78 6.90 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
Model
F 3.42 – – 1.61 4.11 – –
G 3.56 2.64 3.15 1.58 4.22 3.41 3.85
G∗ 5.82 5.26 5.56 3.55 5.55 4.92 5.26
H 1.25 0.73 1.03 0.07 1.25 0.73 1.02
I 2.78 1.86 2.36 1.07 3.20 2.37 2.81
J 1.25 0.70 1.01 0.07 1.25 0.69 1.01
Notes: Mean percentage returns of equity (RE), housing (RH), total risk (RT ) and bills (R f ) as well as the
equity (EP), housing (HP), and the total risk premium (T P). The corresponding standard deviations σ(X )
as well as the Sharpe ratios of equity (SRE), of housing (SRH) and of total risk (SRT ). We employ projection
methods and simulated time series with 100,000 periods. The sample does not include disasters except
for row G*. F: Benchmark rare disaster. G: F + Housing (no disaster sample). G*: F + Housing (disaster
sample). H: G but constant disaster probability. I: G but constant disaster size. J: G but constant disaster
probability and size.
the data and the model can replicate an equity premium of 6.56 percent. In accordance to
the data, the return on housing (4.35 percent) and the housing premium (3.00 percent)
turn out smaller than the return on equity and the equity premium. Yet, they remain
approximately 1.5 percentage points below the values found in the data. Nevertheless, the
model can closely match the empirical total risk premium. The model can further generate
a low volatility of government bonds and reproduces the empirically observed standard
deviations of returns and premia on housing fairly well. The standard deviations of equity
returns and premia in the model are less than half of their empirical counterparts. Risk
premia in the model are moderately more volatile than the risky return rates. Although
the return rates and volatilities differ between the two risky assets, their Sharpe ratios turn
out almost identical at approximately 0.9 and also coincide with the Sharpe ratio of total
risk. Hence, the model can closely replicate the Sharpe ratio of housing of approximately
1.01 in the data but fails for the Sharpe ratio of equity which is substantially lower at 0.36
in the data.
Turning to business cycle statistics, the volatility of GDP in the model is too small. How-
ever, the model is able to generate relative volatilities of business investments (2.78), res-
idential investments (5.56) and house prices (1.67) which all fit the data. Moreover, the
model also reproduces the empirically observed correlation between GDP and residential
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Table 9: Simulated returns, premiums and second moments II (default and leverage)
RlevE RH R
lev
T Rg b EP
lev HP T P lev SRE SRH SRT
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27 0.36 1.01 0.75
Model
F 7.64 – – 1.07 6.52 – – 0.92 – –
G 7.93 4.35 6.34 1.31 6.56 3.00 4.98 0.90 0.91 0.91
G∗ 6.08 2.80 4.63 0.03 6.04 2.76 4.60 0.66 0.61 0.65
H 10.87 4.91 8.25 −0.72 11.65 5.66 9.02 5.80 7.75 6.22
I 6.05 4.04 5.17 2.42 3.57 1.59 2.70 0.66 0.69 0.67
J 7.51 4.42 6.17 1.59 5.86 2.80 4.53 2.93 4.06 3.15
σ(RlevE ) σ(RH) σ(R
lev
T ) σ(Rg b) σ(EP
lev) σ(HP) σ(T P lev)
USA 16.71 3.78 6.90 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
Model
F 6.47 – – 1.43 7.12 – –
G 6.67 2.64 4.87 1.39 7.29 3.29 5.50
G∗ 9.34 5.26 7.44 3.45 9.13 4.51 7.08
H 2.01 0.73 1.45 0.07 2.01 0.73 1.45
I 5.03 1.86 3.62 0.94 5.41 2.29 4.01
J 2.00 0.70 1.44 0.07 2.00 0.69 1.44
Notes: Mean percentage returns of leveraged equity (RlevE ), housing (RH), leveraged total risk (R
lev
T ) and
bills (Rgb), as well as the leveraged equity (EP
lev), housing (HP), and the leveraged total risk premium
(T P lev) and the corresponding standard deviations σ(X ). We employ projection methods and simulated
time series with 100,000 periods. The sample does not include disasters except for row G*. F: Benchmark
rare disaster. G: F + Housing (no disaster sample). G*: F + Housing (disaster sample). H: G but constant
disaster probability. I: G but constant disaster size. J: G but constant disaster probability and size.
investments and between GDP and house prices. The model shows almost perfect posi-
tive correlations between residential investments and house prices and between residential
investments and business investments—and both correlations are also positive in the data.
The moments discussed so far from simulations without disasters are driven only by the
agents’ expectations about disaster whereas the actual occurrence of disasters is shut off.
Row G* of the tables shows the moments from simulations which include disasters. With
disasters in the sample, the mean return rate of the government bond already falls close to
zero. The return on leveraged equity declines by approximately 2 percentage points and
the equity premium decreases by 0.5 percentage points towards its empirical target. The
return on housing and the housing premium decrease slightly less by approximately 1.5
and 0.25 percentage points, respectively, and we can observe similar effects for the return
on total risk. Of course, the most obvious effect of samples with disasters is on the variables’
second moments. The sample with disasters helps to increase the volatilities of the risky
assets but also implies a counterfactual large standard deviation of the government bond.
Moreover, GDP becomes too volatile and the model’s fit of the relative standard deviations
deteriorates.
The effects of time-varying disaster risk are illustrated in rows H, I, and J, which show
the results from the model if the stochastic nature of the disaster probability, of the disaster
size, or of both components is shut down. First, row H reveals that a time-varying proba-
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USA 1.52 2.91 6.85 2.03 0.67 0.07 0.72 0.64
Model
F 0.90 2.76 – – – – – –
G 0.93 2.78 5.56 1.67 1.00 0.99 0.66 0.66
G* 2.72 1.94 3.55 1.07 1.00 0.96 0.63 0.63
H 0.84 1.12 1.78 0.53 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
I 0.89 2.22 4.01 1.20 1.00 0.98 0.69 0.69
J 0.84 1.12 1.70 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: σx is the standard deviation of x , r
x
y the correlation between x and y . Business cycle statistics
from HP-filtered (1600) times series. We employ projection methods. Business cycle statistics are the mean
outcome of repeated simulations of hp-filtered (1600) times series with 180 periods each. The sample does
not include disasters except for row G*. F: Benchmark rare disaster. G: F + Housing (no disaster sample).
G*: F + Housing (disaster sample). H: G but constant disaster probability. I: G but constant disaster size. J:
G but constant disaster probability and size.
bility for the economy to be hit by a disaster is essential for the model’s dynamics. While
the unlevered return rates on the risky assets and on total risk change only moderately if
the probability for disasters is held constant, the risk-free rate and the return on bonds—
government and corporate—decrease considerably. As a consequence of decreasing return
rates on corporate bonds, the return on leveraged equity increases substantially by more
than 3 percentage points and the leveraged equity premium now exceeds its empirical
value almost by a factor of 2. On the other hand, since the housing premium is unlevered,
it is only affected by the decreasing return on government bonds and, hence, rises only
moderately above its empirical counterpart. The premium on total risk remains close to
the average of the two risky assets. Further, row H shows that a time-varying probability to
enter disasters is also the main factor to generate fluctuations in the return rates. In fact,
with constant disaster probability the standard deviation of bonds falls close to zero and
the standard deviations of returns on the risky assets and on total risk collapse by a factor
of 4-5. Similarly, row H of Table 10 also illustrates that a time-varying disaster probability
helps the model to generate the relative volatilities of business investments, residential in-
vestments and house prices and also helps to disentangle the otherwise perfect correlations
between variables.
Since we assumed an uncorrelated shock process (ρω = 0), the model’s results depend
far less on the stochastic nature of the disaster size. In fact, shocks to the disaster size do
not provoke any reactions of the model’s variables in non-disaster periods but the effects
show only indirect through expectations in the model solution. We can see from row I
of tables 8 and 9 that, if the stochastic effect on the disaster size is shut off, the return
rates on the risky assets and on total risk decline while the return on bonds increases.
Moreover, a time varying disaster size helps to moderately increase the volatilities of all
return rates and also helps to increase the relative volatilities of business investments,
residential investments and house prices (see row I of Table 10). On the other hand, the
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variables’ correlations remain almost unchanged.
4.4 Summary and discussion:
Figure 1 displays the reaction of the model’s variables in response to a one time shock
to technology zt (panels (a)-(c)), to a one time shock to the probability pt of entering a
disaster (panels ((d)-(f)) and to a disaster which lasts for 5 periods (panels (g)-(i)) starting
from the stochastic steady state in a non-disaster period.15 We show percent deviations
from the initial balanced growth path.
First, the variables’ response to a ’classic’ technology shock (panels (a)-(c)) is standard,
and business investments, residential investments, and consumption increase in the period
the shock hits the economy. An increase of business investments implies an increasing To-
bin’s q, qt = (1/ϕ1)(It/Kt)κ, and increasing residential investments imply increasing house
prices, Ph,t = (1/(1−φ))Dφt . Although Dt increases more than It , the elasticity κ of Tobin’s
q exceeds the elasticity φ of house prices and Tobin’s q expands significantly more than
house prices. Moreover, increasing productivity yields an increasing marginal product of
capital and increasing consumption implies an increasing marginal rate of substitution be-
tween housing and consumption. In consequence, the returns on unlevered equity and on
housing increase but—mainly due to the larger elasticity of Tobin’s q—the return on un-
levered equity dominates. Bonds do not react since the technology process is uncorrelated
(ρz = 0), and debt additionally multiplies the effect for the leveraged return on equity.
On the other hand, an increase of the probability for the economy to enter a disaster
has the following effects (see panels (d)-(f)). Positive autocorrelation (ρp > 0) implies an
increased risk for a drop in productivity and for destruction of capital in the next period.
In consequence, the representative agent lowers investments in productive capital and in
residential structures and increases consumption instead. Decreasing investments entail
drops in Tobin’s q and in house prices. Although investments in residential structures de-
cline more than investments in productive capital, the different elasticities again imply
that the effect on Tobin’s q dominates the effect on house prices. Moreover, a reduction of
working hours implies a decreasing marginal product of capital rt whereas increasing con-
sumption implies that the marginal rate of substitution between housing and consumption
increases. The more pronounced drop in Tobin’s q compared to the drop in house prices
combined with an increasing MRSH,C yields a larger contraction of the return on unlev-
ered equity than of the return on housing and the effect is further amplified by leverage.
Finally, increased disaster risk increases the stochastic discount factor so that bond prices
increase. Yet, the effect is significantly smaller than on the risky assets.
Lastly, an occurrence of a disaster (panels ((g)-(i)) implies that technology At drops by
the factor eω̄ as long as the disaster continues. In the period the disaster starts, a second ef-
fect appears. The probability that the disaster remains persistent raises to q = 0.93 whereas
the probability to enter a disaster was initially only p ≈ 0.0072. The massive increase in
probability for continued destruction of technology, capital and residential structures in the
15As already noted, the assumption of an iid process for the disaster size (ρω = 0) implies that shocks to the
disaster size do not provoke any reaction of the model’s remaining variables.
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(i) Disaster bt = 1 (III)
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subsequent period has the previously described effects—amplified by a multitude. The two
effects combined—drop in productivity and increased risk for the disaster to persist—cause
huge drops of business investments and residential investments in the initial period of the
disaster. In the following disaster periods, expectations do not change anymore until the
disaster ends so that investments are only effected by decreasing technology, capital and
residential structures. The initial drop of business investments exceeds the destruction of
productive capital so that Tobin’s q also collapses. In the following periods the effect turns
and business investments decline by less than the rate at which capital is destructed so
that Tobin’s q begins to slowly recover. On the other hand, since land is not destructed,
house prices continue to decline as long as Dt declines. Finally, once the disaster ends,
the probability for the economy to be hit by a disaster again jumps back to p ≈ 0.0072.
The massive change in expectations leads to a boom immediately after the disaster. Both
investments increase and so do Tobin’s q and house prices. The huge drops in Tobin’s q
and in house prices at the start of the disaster yield huge drops in the return rates while
the boom after the disaster ends implies huge yields of both risky assets.
Summing up, the model can generate different premia for unlevered equity and housing
mainly due to different elasticities for Tobin’s q and for house prices. Additionally, the gap
between the two risky assets can be enlarged by leverage. However, we could not achieve
further improvements of the model fit, in particular for the volatility of the return on equity,
by fine-tuning the parameters controlling the elasticities of Tobin’s q and of house prices.
Increasing the elasticity κ of Tobin’s q has the desired effect and helps to generate more
volatile return rates on equity. However, it also implies a too large premium on equity
compared to housing and, counterfactual to the data, reduces the volatility of business
investments. Decreasing the elasticity of house prices φ also impairs the model’s fit. At
odds to the data, the return on housing and its volatility decrease while the Sharpe ratio
of housing further increases.16
The main shortcoming of the model’s asset price statistics, independent of the calibra-
tion, remains the fact that the Sharpe ratios of the two risky assets turn out far too similar.17
In order to identify the reasons for this failure, we can return to equation (4). Note that

































Hence, proceeding in an analogous way as before, the Sharpe ratio of housing and of
16See Appendix B.
17Different from the non-disaster models in section 3, we did not optimize the model’s fit by matching
moments with regard to the ’free’ parameters. First, even with more efficient methods such as Polynomial
Chaos Expansions proposed by Fehrle et al. (2019) such parameter inference would still be too time
consuming. Second, we argue that it is the model’s structure which is too simple to disentangle the
Sharpe ratios of equity and housing.
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E SRH rM ,EP rM ,EPlev rM ,HP rEP,HP rEPlev,HP
Data
USA – – 0.36 1.01 – – – – 0.19
Model
G 0.64 0.88 0.90 0.91 −0.70 −0.76 −0.66 0.99 0.98
G* 0.96 0.62 0.66 0.61 −0.62 −0.66 −0.61 0.99 0.98
Notes: SRE : annualized Sharpe ratio of equity, SRH : annualized Sharpe ratio of housing, rX ,Y : correlation
between variables X and Y where Mt+1 : stochastic discount factor, EPt+1 := RE,t+1 − R f ,t : ex-post equity
premium, HPt+1 := RH,t+1 − R f ,t : ex-post housing premium.
















































We summarize the decomposition of the Sharpe ratios in Table 11. Note however, that we
compute moments from the simulation of the model’s equilibrium outcomes so that the
decompositions (8) only hold for samples that are consistent with the agent’s expectations
in the model solution, i.e. for samples which include disasters (G*). For non-disaster sam-
ples (G), it can be interpreted at best as a rough approximation which neglects the effects
from the occurrence of disasters.
Nonetheless, the major deficit of the model is obvious. The return rates and also the
premia between the two risky assets are again almost perfectly correlated so that their
correlations with the stochastic discount factor are practically identical. The model’s rela-
tively simple structure implies that the effects of shocks on risky return rates are aligned
and may only differ in size. This fact also becomes clearly evident from Figure 1 and the
above interpretation of the impulse response functions. Hence, by (8) the Sharpe ratios of
the two assets must be the same. Compared to the models without disaster risk in Table
6, the introduction of disasters risk raises the standard deviation of the stochastic discount
factor by a factor of 4. The model can therefore explain substantially larger Sharpe ratios
and matches the value of housing from the data. Yet, it now fails to simultaneously gener-
ate the lower Sharpe ratio of equity and, in consequence, produces far to involatile return
rates on equity. Finally, the perfect correlation between the risky assets still implies that
the mean and the standard deviation of returns on total risk are the weighted averages
of the two risky assets. In order to explain the different Sharpe ratios of the two assets
and in order to prevent the counterfactual characteristics of the total portfolio, it would be
necessary to introduce effects into the model which help to dissolve the perfect correlation
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between the risky return rates.
Any mechanism that increases the volatility of the retrun on equity and decreases, in
absolute terms, the correlation of the return on equity with the stochastic discount factor
would improve the models fit. Assuming additionally that cooperate bonds could default in
normal times meets these requirements.18 The additional source of uncertainty increases
the volatility of the return on equity while the assumption of independence decrease in
absolute terms the correlation between the stochastic discount factor and the return on
equity.
Other mechanisms concerning housing specific characteristics could improve the model’s
fit in general. E.g. due to the poor divisibility of housing, there may be credit constrained
households which can only invest in equity. For them it would be impossible to smooth
the consumption bundle by adjusting consumption and residential investment and subse-
quently the equity premia would increase. Albeit, housing investment participation dis-
tributes far broader and is less concentrated towards the top quantiles than the participa-
tion at the stock market as Kuhn et al. (Forthcomming) show. This indicates that the effect
is minimal at best.
Among others, Mian et al. (2013) find a large effect of housing wealth on consump-
tion. Modeling such a channel would increase in absolute terms the correlation between
house prices and the stochastic discount factor and thus between the return on housing
and the stochastic discount factor, which would separate the Sharpe ratios. Theoretical
foundations for a large causal effect are given e.g. by Berger et al. (2017) and Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2017). Gertler and Gilchrist (2018) summarize this channel in a review as
follows: Mortgages are the household’s most common structure of debt. Hence, declining
house prices increase the households leverage ratio and the resulting tightened budget
constraint forces the household to reduce his consumption spending.
Last, the fact that the risk of housing wealth is more idiosyncratic increases the volatility
of the return on housing on an individual level. This is neither observable in a representa-
tive agent framework nor in the aggregated data of JKKST and thus explains potentially the
difference in the Sharpe ratios. The PSID-based data from Flavin and Yamashita (2002)
imply a Sharpe ratio of equity of 0.35, similar to the aggregated one, but the Sharpe ratio
of housing is reduced by half to 0.47. Even if this explains a large part, a differential of
one third remains.
5 CONCLUSION
In the present paper, we study the effects of housing on asset pricing statistics, especially on
risk premia, in production economies. The stylized facts for asset prices which we consider
are: i) a risk-free rate in the range of 1-2.2 percent together with a low volatility, ii) return
rates on equity moderately larger than returns on housing, iii) premia on risky returns
over 3 percent, iii) return rates and premia on equity which are at least twice as volatile
as return rates and premia on housing and on total risk, and iv) a Sharpe ratio of housing
18Gourio (2012) argues e.g. the financial crises 2008 was not a great diasaster and US-treasury bonds and
bills did not default. Nevertheless, a lot of cooporate bonds defaulted.
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significantly larger than the Sharpe ratio of equity and similar to the Sharpe ratio of total
risk. Since we study production economies, we also check the model’s compatibility to
the following well-established stylized facts of housing and business cycles: i) volatility of
residential investments exceeds the volatility of business investments, ii) house prices are
at least twice as volatile as GDP and are positively correlated with GDP, and iv) residential
investments co-moves with house prices, GDP, and business investments.
We first introduce housing into non-disaster economies with habits and capital adjust-
ment costs a la Jermann (1998). Housing provides the household with an insurance
against fluctuations in the composite good and the model’s ability to generate sizeable
risk premia vanishes in consequence. However, the household’s desire to smooth his con-
sumption of the composite good induces demand effects which coincide with business
cycle characteristics. Limitation of the household’s option to smooth consumption of the
composite good helps to generate modest risk premia but also eliminates the demand ef-
fects and hence reduces the model’s fit to business cycle statistics. Moreover, the risk-free
rate is far too volatile in the model and the model fails to explain the empirically observed
differences between the returns on equity and on housing.
Second, we extend a standard RBC model with disaster risk similar to Gourio (2012)
and Fernández-Villaverde and Levintal (2018) by housing. We find that the model can
reproduce return rates on leveraged equity, on housing and on government bonds which
are all close to the data. Moreover, the model can also match the volatility of government
bonds and housing returns but equity returns are too involatile compared to the data. Dif-
ferent premia and different volatilities for equity and housing in the model are the result
of i) different adjustment costs for productive capital and for residential structures which
result in different elasticities of stock prices and of ii) leverage on equity. However, despite
different premia and volatilities between the two risky assets, the model does not allow
to disentangle the Sharpe ratios. Our calibration allows close replication of the empiri-
cal Sharpe ratios of housing and of total risk while the Sharpe ratio of equity exceeds its
empirical counterpart substantially. Finally, regardless of its rather simple structure, the
model is also able to generate relative volatilities of business investments, residential in-
vestments and house prices which all fit the data. Moreover, the model also reproduces the
empirically observed correlation between GDP and residential investments and between
GDP and house prices.
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A STYLIZED FACTS AND DATA RESOURCES
A.1 Stylized facts
In Table 12 we present return rates for all countries from the JKKST database. We observe
the following stylized facts. First, risk premia in all countries are sizeable with equity
premia between 1.17 percent in Portugal and 12.91 percent in Finland, and housing pre-
mia between 3.47 and 8.39 percent in Germany and Norway, respectively. Second, in all
countries except for Italy and Portugal the return on housing is lower than the return on
equity. Third, in all countries listed the volatility of returns and premia on equity exceeds
the volatility of returns and premia on housing and the volatility of the risk-free rate is the
smallest. Fourth, the Sharp ratio of housing is larger than of equity in all listed countries.
Last, there is no systematic nexus between the return on housing and on equity.
Table 13 displays the business cycle statistics for the same countries. Note that for sev-
eral continental European countries the standard deviation of residential investment ex-
ceeds the standard deviation of business investment only slightly or is even smaller. More
precisely, this is the case for France, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, and Spain. House prices are pro-cyclical with GDP and more volatile than GDP
in all countries except for Germany. Business investment and residential investment are
positively correlated in all countries but Sweden and Australia, and house prices and resi-
dential investment are positively correlated throughout.
A.2 Sources
The data pertaining the rates of return, mortgage etc. are from JKKST. The source of the
data pertaining the business cycle statistics is listed below:
• GDP, residential investment, non-residential investment: OECD Economic Outlook
Nov 2018; Denmark: Statistics Denmark.
• House prices: OECD Real house price indices, s.a. 16.05.2019 devided by the OECD
Economic Outlook Nov 2018 CPI Deflator.
• Population: FRA, USA: OECD Total population PERSA: Persons, seasonally adjusted;
UK: Office for National Statistics UK, resident population: mid-year estimates (Qtly
data interpolated (by the Office); Otherwise: Yearly, Worldbank, midyear (interpo-
lated (by own calculation)).
• Home ownership rates: Japan (2007): http://www.stat.go.jp/english/index.html;
USA (2007), Australia (2003): https://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/evolution
%20of%20homeownership%20rates.pdf p.212; Otherwise (2010): EUROSTAT "Eu-
rostat - Data Explorer - Distribution of population by tenure status, type of household
and income group"
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Table 12: Returns, premiums and second moments
RE RH RT R f EP HP T P
AUS 6.84 7.01 7.22 2.00 4.84 5.02 5.22
BEL 10.29 8.02 8.65 2.49 7.80 5.53 6.16
DNK 13.35 6.6 8.69 0.72 12.63 5.88 7.96
FIN 14.17 8.84 11.67 1.25 12.91 7.59 10.41
FRA 9.61 5.78 6.61 2.24 7.37 3.54 4.37
GER 9.04 4.75 5.75 1.28 7.76 3.47 4.47
ITA 4.76 5.62 5.89 1.55 3.21 4.07 4.34
JPA 5.86 5.54 6.19 0.98 4.88 4.56 5.21
NLD 8.93 7.83 8.12 1.44 7.49 6.38 6.68
NOR 13.03 9.82 10.66 1.43 11.60 8.39 9.23
PRT 2.92 6.65 6.62 1.75 1.17 4.89 4.87
ESP 7.10 4.43 4.89 0.69 6.40 3.74 4.20
SWE 12.29 8.82 10.56 0.91 11.38 7.92 9.65
CH 7.23 6.01 6.98 −0.17 7.40 6.19 7.16
UK 8.00 7.00 7.47 1.56 6.44 5.44 5.91
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27
σ(RE) σ(RH ) σ(RT ) σ(R f ) σ(EP) σ(HP) σ(T P)
AUS 21.53 5.71 6.02 3.32 21.32 6.22 6.27
BEL 22.99 6.04 6.37 2.84 23.08 6.61 7.02
DNK 23.84 7.72 8.91 1.56 24.33 7.24 8.93
FIN 37.72 9.13 21.58 4.52 36.90 9.64 21.39
FRA 24.11 5.52 6.95 2.55 23.98 6.18 7.39
GER 22.82 3.12 5.09 1.73 23.12 4.30 5.99
ITA 27.98 10.77 10.07 3.18 27.57 11.51 10.74
JPA 20.15 6.53 8.10 2.53 19.94 6.47 8.03
NLD 22.06 9.14 9.40 2.91 22.13 9.68 9.91
NOR 29.60 8.51 9.02 2.39 29.66 9.64 10.12
PRT 26.86 7.26 7.64 2.57 26.81 7.39 7.64
ESP 27.13 8.36 8.62 4.43 25.93 8.19 8.10
SWE 26.03 7.35 11.67 2.06 25.75 7.22 11.42
CH 21.61 4.59 8.01 2.29 21.41 4.94 7.97
UK 8.00 7 7.47 1.56 6.44 5.44 5.91
USA 16.71 3.78 6.90 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
SRE SRH SRT rEP,HP rEP,TP rHP,TP
Data
AUS 0.23 0.81 0.83 −0.09 0.58 0.72
BEL 0.34 0.84 0.88 −0.05 0.43 0.87
DNK 0.52 0.81 0.89 0.37 0.81 0.83
FIN 0.35 0.79 0.49 0.25 0.83 0.5
FRA 0.31 0.57 0.59 0.06 0.63 0.76
GER 0.34 0.81 0.75 0.21 0.79 0.74
ITA 0.12 0.35 0.4 −0.24 −0.01 0.97
JPA 0.24 0.7 0.65 0.16 0.79 0.72
NLD 0.34 0.66 0.67 0.02 0.52 0.84
NOR 0.39 0.87 0.91 −0.01 0.46 0.86
PRT 0.04 0.66 0.64 0.07 0.49 0.89
ESP 0.25 0.46 0.52 0.09 0.4 0.94
SWE 0.44 1.1 0.85 0.01 0.8 0.5
CH 0.35 1.25 0.9 −0.19 0.88 0.18
UK 0.27 0.61 0.69 −0.13 0.72 0.54
USA 0.36 1.01 0.75 0.19 0.9 0.56
Notes: Mean percentage returns of equity (RE), housing (RH), total risk (RT ) and bills (R f ) as well as the
equity (EP), housing (HP), and the total risk premium (T P) and the corresponding standard deviations
σ(X ). SRE : Sharpe ratio of equity, SRH : Sharpe ratio of housing, SRT : Sharpe ratio of total risk rX ,Y :
correlation between variables X and Y where EPt+1 := RE,t+1 − R f ,t : ex-post equity premium, HPt+1 :=
RH,t+1−R f ,t : ex-post housing premium T Pt+1 := RT,t+1−R f ,t : ex-post total risk premium. Periods: Australia
1970-2015, Belgium 1976-2015, Denmark 1995-2015, Finland 1970-2015, France 1980-2015, Germany
1991-2015, Italy 1970-2015, Japan 1963-2015, the Netherlands 1970-2015, Norway 1978-2015, Portugal
1988-2015. Spain 1971-2015, Sweden 1970-2015, Switzerland 1970-2015, United Kingdom 1969-2015,
USA 1970-2015, data from JKKST, own calculations.
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AUS 1.24 3.77 6.65 3.56 0.55 −0.12 0.56 0.35
BEL 1.02 4.21 7.19 3.54 0.62 0.22 0.47 0.31
DNK 1.42 3.52 5.95 3.96 0.60 0.28 0.66 0.75
FIN 2.21 2.87 3.15 3.00 0.73 0.40 0.67 0.66
FRA 0.95 2.75 3.17 3.19 0.65 0.64 0.81 0.48
GER 1.47 2.54 2.20 0.82 0.06 0.49 0.57 −0.16
ITA 1.44 2.66 1.67 3.73 0.25 0.37 0.46 0.15
JPA 1.59 2.41 3.84 2.70 0.31 0.27 0.45 0.55
NLD 1.37 5.86 5.57 4.08 0.40 0.31 0.48 0.35
NOR 1.46 4.68 4.51 3.72 0.60 0.28 0.31 0.56
PRT 1.58 3.37 2.58 1.87 0.40 0.56 0.64 0.50
ESP 1.33 3.48 3.42 4.17 0.43 0.69 0.77 0.61
SWE 1.51 4.46 5.20 2.95 0.42 −0.22 0.04 0.57
CHE 1.64 – – 2.69 – – – 0.61
UK 1.58 2.68 5.56 4.85 0.51 0.16 0.69 0.71
USA 1.52 2.91 6.85 2.03 0.67 0.07 0.72 0.64
Notes: Business cycle statistics are from quarterly logged per capita hp-filtered (1600) data. σx is the
standard deviation of x , r xy the correlation between x and y . RESI=residential investment, BUSI=non-
residential investment, Ph house prices. Periods: Australia 1970-2015, Belgium 1976-2015, Denmark 1995-
2015, Finland 1970-2015, France 1980-2015, Germany 1991-2015, Italy 1970-2015, Japan 1963-2015,
the Netherlands 1970-2015, Norway 1978-2015, Portugal 1988-2015. Spain 1971-2015, Sweden 1970-
2015, Switzerland 1970-2015, United Kingdom 1969-2015, USA 1970-2015, Data: See Appendix A, own
calculations.
B FURTHER RESULTS
Economies with Non-Disaster risk
Higher share of land’s value in new houses: We show the results from increasing the
share of land in the Jermann (1998) model with housing to φ = 0.3 in row K of tables 15
and 16. First, the return rates on both risky assets increase moderately while the risk-free
rate decreases slightly. Nevertheless, the model can still not produce sizable risk premia.
The volatility of residential investment decreases only moderately and remains far too
large. On the other hand, house prices in the model become noticeably more volatile than
empirically observed.
We also present the results for the two-sector model à la Boldrin et al. (2001) with φ =
0.3 in rows L, M, and N of tables 15 and 16. We fine-tune the free parameters by matching
moments in the same way as we did for φ = 0.106 and summarize the parameters’ values
in Table 14. Risk premia decrease moderately in model L compared to model C and again
vanish if labor supply is endogenously determined in model M. In model N with limited
sectoral labor mobility changes are only negligible compared to model E. The volatility of
house prices increases in all three models and, as Fehrle (2019) shows, the correlations
also increase. Nevertheless, with labor market frictions house prices do not co-move with
residential investment.
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To sum up, an increase in the share of land’s value in new houses does not affect the
conclusion that the present framework can not simultaneously reproduce asset pricing
statistics and business cycle statistics as observed in the data.
Table 14: Calibration























Notes: ∗) Endogenous by the model. L: C but φ = 0.3. M/N: D/E but φ = 0.3.
Habitat without habits: The effects of habits in consumption, housing and leisure, respec-
tively, can be discussed by setting the corresponding habit parameter to zero in model E.
First, rows N of tables 15 and 16 show that habits in housing have negligible consequences
for the presented business cycle characteristics and only small significance for risk premia.
Without habits in housing, risk premia on both assets are reduced by approximately 0.8
percentage points. Rows O of the same tables show that without habits in leisure risk
premia are halved. Moreover, the volatility of house prices reduces towards its empir-
ical counterpart but business investment becomes even less volatile and the correlation
between GDP and residential investment also moves farther away from the value in the
data.
Habits in consumption, see row P of tables 15 and 16, have the largest effect on the
results from model E. Without habits in consumption the household’s marginal utility does
not fluctuate enough between different realizations of the productivity shock so that risk
premia reduce drastically. While business investment becomes less volatile, the standard
deviation of residential investment increases. Moreover, the correlation between house
prices and residential investment becomes positive and the correlation between business
and residential investment also increases substantially.
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Table 15: Returns, premiums and second moments
RE RH RT R f EP HP T P
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27
Model
K 4.83 4.59 4.72 4.03 0.77 0.54 0.67
L 4.84 4.61 4.70 0.50 4.33 4.10 4.19
M 2.70 2.60 2.64 1.95 0.74 0.64 0.68
N 4.92 4.69 4.78 1.39 3.49 3.27 3.36
O 4.31 4.11 4.19 1.67 2.61 2.41 2.49
P 3.40 3.32 3.36 2.05 1.34 1.26 1.29
Q 2.66 2.50 2.57 2.02 0.63 0.47 0.54
R 5.16 3.87 4.59 1.36 3.76 2.49 3.20
Rlev 8.24 3.87 6.30 1.55 6.62 2.30 4.70
σ(RE) σ(RH) σ(RT ) σ(R f ) σ(EP) σ(HP) σ(T P)
USA 16.71 3.78 6.9 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
Model
K 8.25 6.01 7.29 1.45 8.09 5.80 7.11
L 22.43 21.47 21.86 8.49 20.62 19.57 19.99
M 8.82 7.70 8.14 2.13 8.54 7.37 7.84
N 22.77 21.81 22.19 12.84 18.62 17.42 17.90
O 19.93 19.00 19.39 11.59 16.04 14.87 15.36
P 14.75 14.17 14.41 8.65 11.92 11.17 11.49
Q 8.32 6.63 7.32 3.05 7.73 5.86 6.64
R 3.71 1.68 2.73 1.51 4.33 2.59 3.45
Rlev 6.83 1.68 4.45 1.32 7.41 2.44 5.07
Notes: Mean percentage returns of equity (RE), housing (RH), total risk (RT ) and bills (R f ) as well as the
equity (EP), housing (HP), and the total risk premium (T P) and the corresponding standard deviations
σ(X ). We employ a second order perturbation and simulated time series with 100,000 periods. K: B but
φ = 0.3. L:L: C but φ = 0.3,χh = 0.7. M: D but φ = 0.3,χh = 0.7. N: E but φ = 0.3,χh = 0.7. O: E but
χh = 0. P: E but χn = 0. Q: E but χc = 0. R: G but φ = 0.106. Rlev: R but with leverage and default,
housing remain not leveraged.
Housing with disaster risk
Lower share of land’s value in new houses: Tables 15 and 16 display in rows R and Rlev
the effects from lowering the share of land in our disaster economies to φ = 0.106 as in
Davis and Heathcote (2005). We find that returns on equity do not change by much but
housing premia decrease by 0.7 percentage-points and the standard deviation of returns on
housing is reduced by 0.96. The Sharpe ratio of housing exceeds its empirical counterpart.
Moreover, the volatility of house prices drops below the standard deviation of GDP. The
lower share of land in new houses increases the volatility of residential investment which
now becomes too large.
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USA 1.52 2.91 6.85 2.03 0.67 0.07 0.72 0.63
Model
K 1.05 1.10 11.44 3.26 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98
L 2.11 1.05 1.03 4.79 −0.03 0.00 0.06 0.96
M 1.42 0.77 4.39 3.04 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.94
N 1.9 0.96 2.12 4.23 0.04 0.14 0.39 0.91
O 1.95 0.84 1.83 3.57 −0.06 0.07 0.35 0.88
P 1.89 0.65 2.16 2.73 −0.1 0.01 0.28 0.89
Q 1.44 0.71 2.95 2.17 0.11 0.35 0.52 0.91
R 1.01 2.59 8.51 0.90 1.00 0.89 0.68 0.68
Notes: σx is the standard deviation of x , r
x
y the correlation between x and y . Business cycle statistics from
HP-filtered (1600) times series. We employ a second order perturbation and report the average outcomes
from repeated simulations with 180 periods. K: B but φ = 0.3. L: C but φ = 0.3,χh = 0.7. M: D but
φ = 0.3,χh = 0.7. N: E but φ = 0.3,χh = 0.7. O: E but χh = 0. P: E but χn = 0. Q: E but χc = 0. R: G but
φ = 0.106.
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C ECONOMIES WITH NON-DISASTER RISK
We summarize the details for the models discussed in section 3.
C.1 Housing with Jermann (1998)
The equilibrium conditions from the optimization problem (1) for the benchmark Jermann
(1998) model which is extended by housing are determined by
Λt = µc(Ct − Cht)µc(1−η)−1(Ht −Hht)µh(1−η), (9a)
Yt = a
(1−αy )t Zt K
αy
t , (9b)























Ht+1 = (1−δh)Ht + D1−φt , (9h)
Ch,t+1 = χcCt , (9i)































given the state variables Kt , Ht , Ch,t , Hh,t and Zt . Additionally, the log of productivity fol-
lows the exogenous AR(1)-process
ln Zt+1 = ρy ln Zt + εt+1, εt ∼ iidN(0,σ2y).
Finally, GDP is defined by
GDPt = Yt +MRS
H,C








We re-scale the variables by kt :=
Kt
at , ht :=
Ht
a(1−φ)t , ch,t :=
Ch,t
at , hh,t :=
Hh,t





at , it :=
It
at , dt :=
Dt
at , ph,t :=
Ph,t
aφ t , and λt :=
Λt
a((µc+(1−φ)µh)(1−η)−1)t . Hence, system (9) in
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scaled variables reads
λt = µc(ct − cht)µc(1−η)−1(ht − hht)µh(1−η), (10a)
yt = Zt k
αy
t , (10b)























a1−φht+1 = (1−δh)ht + d1−φt , (10h)
ach,t+1 = χcct , (10i)































C.2 Moving to Boldrin et al. (2001)
We continue to present the details for the two-sector models from section 3.
Sectoral frictions with exogenous labor supply:
max






((Ct − Cht)µc(Ht −Hht)µh)1−η − 1
1−η ,
s.t. Yt = a
(1−αy )t
y Zy t K
αy
y t ,
Yt = Ct + It ,
Dt = a
(1−αd )t
d Zd t K
αd
d t ,
It = Id t + I y t ,












Ht+1 = (1−δh)Ht + D1−φt .
(11)
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whereη,αy ,αd , ay , ad ,µc,µh > 0,µc+µh = 1,δk ∈ [0, 1],δh ∈ [0, 1] andΦy(x) = ϕy,11−κy x1−κy+
ϕy,2 and Φd analogously.
First, if labor supply is exogenous, the system of equations derived from the optimization
problem (11) for an equilibrium in period t reads



















































Ht+1 = (1−δh)Ht + D1−φt , (12l)
Ch,t+1 = χcCt , (12m)
















































given the state variables Ky,t , Kd,t , Ht , Ch,t , Hh,t , Zy,t and Zd,t . Additionally, the log of
productivity follows the exogenous AR(1)-process
ln Zy,t+1 = ρy ln Zy,t + εy,t+1,
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Finally, GDP is defined by
GDPt = Yt + Pd,t Dt ++MRS
H,C


































































. Hence, system (12) in scaled
variables reads
λt = µc(ct − cht)µc(1−η)−1(ht − hht)µh(1−η), (13a)
yt = Zy,t k
αy
y,t , (13b)
dt = Zd,t k
αd
d,t , (13c)













































ht+1 = (1−δh)ht + d1−φt , (13l)








































































((Ct − Cht)µc(Ht −Hht)µh((1− Nt)− (1− Nht))µn)1−η − 1
1−η ,






Yt = Ct + It ,










where now µc,µh,µn > 0,µc +µh +µn = 1.
If labor supply is endogenous in the model as in (14), the system of equations defining an
equilibrium in the scaled variables remains as in (13) with the following adjustments to the
production functions and to the marginal utility of consumption and with the additional
equations pinning down labor supply



























(1− Nt)− (1− Nh,t)
, (15e)
Nt = Ny,t − Nd,t , (15f)
Nh,t+1 = 1−χn(1− Nt). (15g)
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Limited labor mobility Finally, if the household is unable to adapt his labor supply in re-
sponse to technology shocks but is committed to working hours that are contracted sector-
























(1− Nt+1)− (1− Nh,t+1)

= 0. (16b)
D HOUSING WITH DISASTER RISK
We present the details for the model with disaster risk from section 4.
Disaster Risk The economy faces a risk for great disasters which are introduced through
an exogenous shock in form of a binary variable bt which indicates disasters in case of
bt = 1 while bt = 0 in normal times. Disasters reduce productivity but also partly destroy
the stock of productive capital and of residential structures (see below). Following Gou-
rio (2012) disasters appear with time-varying probability and size. More specifically, we
assume that
P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 0) =min{pt , 1}, P(bt+1 = 0|bt = 0) = 1−min{pt , 1}
where the log of pt follows an AR(1)-process
ln pt+1 = (1−ρp) ln p̄+ρp ln pt + εp,t+1, εp,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2p).
Additionally, disasters remain persistent with probability no less than q ∈ (0,1) so that
P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 1) =max{q,min{pt , 1}}, P(bt+1 = 0|bt = 1) = 1−max{q, min{pt , 1}}.
Finally, the disaster size 1− eωt+1 at which productivity, productive capital and residential
structures are destroyed by a disaster also evolves stochastically according to
ωt := ω̄e
ω̂t ,






where ω̄ < 0. We slightly deviate from the treatment in Gourio (2012) in the specification
of the process governing the disaster size and allow autocorrelation but restrict outcomes
to ωt < 0 so that disasters always have negative effects. The specification is similar to
Fernández-Villaverde and Levintal (2018).
Representative Household The household derives utility from a composite good C̃t that
is represented by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate consisting of consumption Ct , housing Ht and
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t (1− Nt)1−µc−µh .
We assume that the household’s preferences over streams of the composite good are de-
















where ψ is the household’s EIS and γ the coefficient of RRA. Note however that γ and
ψ describe the household’s RRA and EIS with respect to the composite good C̃ . Since the
composite good aggregator is of the Cobb-Douglas type, the consumption-based RRA is
given by µcγ and the consumption-based EIS reads
1
1−µc(1−1/ψ) .
19 For easier notation we
define Vt := Ṽ
1−1/ψ
t which satisfies the recursion
Vt = (1− β)C̃
1− 1ψ





where we use, similar to Caldara et al. (2012), the notation
θ := 1− 1− γ
1− 1ψ
.
In the case where θ = 0, the RRA equals the reciprocal of the EIS and the household’s
utility reduces to the ‘classical’ expected discounted sum of within period CRRA utilities.
Hence, θ can also be interpreted as the deviation from this ‘classic’ case. The representative
household supplies labor services Nt and capital services Kt and receives wages Wt and
capital rents rt . He buys consumption goods Ct and invests in productive capital It and
new houses Hnew,t with relative price Ph,t . Hence, his budget constraint reads
Wt Nt + rt Kt = Ct + It + Ph,t Hnew,t .
We assume capital adjustment costs as in Jermann (1998). Moreover, disasters result in
the destruction of a fraction 1− eωt+1 of the stocks of capital and residential structures so





















19See Swanson (2012) and Heiberger and Ruf (2019).
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where δk,δh ∈ [0,1] and Φ(x) := ϕ11−κ x1−κ+ϕ2. The household maximizes life-time utility
Vt subject to his budget constraint and subject to the laws of accumulation for capital and























































(Et V 1−θt+1 )1/(1−θ )
−θ






Representative Firm The firm produces output Yt from labor Nt and capital services Kt





Labor augmenting technical progress At grows stochastically and is damaged during dis-
asters such way that
At+1 = At ae
zt+1+ωt+1 bt+1 ,
zt+1 = ρzzt + εz,t+1, εz,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2z ).
The firm’s first order conditions from maximization of profits Yt −Wt Nt − rt Kt subject to









Construction Sector Finally, residential investments Dt are combined with a fixed factor













Pl,t = φPh,t D
1−φ
t .
General Equilibrium Summing up, in any period t the economy’s equilibrium is charac-
terized by the following system of equations
At = At−1e
zt+ωt bt , (17a)
Kt = e
ωt bt K?t , (17b)
Ht = e











































































Vt = (1− β)(Cµct (1− Nt)µn Hµht )1−
1
ψ + β(Et V 1−θt+1 )
1
1−θ , (17p)
given the state variables K?t , H
?








(Et V 1−θt+1 )1/(1−θ )
−θ
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Moreover, the exogenous state variables are governed by the stochastic processes
zt+1 = ρzzt + εz,t+1, εz,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2z ), (18a)
ln pt+1 = (1−ρp) ln p̄+ρp ln pt + εp,t+1, εp,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2p), (18b)
ωt := ω̄e






P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 0) =min{pt , 1}, P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 1) =max{q,min{pt , 1}}. (18d)
Finally, we define GDP as the sum of consumption, both investment types and the implicit
rent from housing
GDPt = Yt +MRS
H,C





















































. Hence, the system of equations (17) can
be written equivalently in terms of the scaled variables as
at = e
zt+ωt bt , (19a)
kt = e
ωt bt k?t , (19b)
ht = e

















































































vt = (1− β)(cµct (1− Nt)µnhµht )1−
1













(Et v1−θt+1 )1/(1−θ )
−θ
.
Solution Method First, note that given period t ’s scaled state variables k?t , h
?
t , zt ,ωt , pt
and bt and the control variables for labor supply Nt , house prices ph,t and the value function
vt , all other period t variables as well as next period’s endogenous state variables can be
easily computed from equations (19a)-(19m). We approximate the policy functions for
Nt , ph,t and the value function vt by linear combinations of Chebyshev polynomials. We
compute the coefficients in the linear combinations such way that the Euler equations
(19n) and (19o) and the recursive equation (19p) for the value function are satisfied
exactly at a sparse grid of collocation points (see Judd et al. (2014) and Heer and Maussner
(2009) for details). Thereby, the expectations with respect to normally distributed random
variables are computed by Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
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